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QUANTIFYING INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY IN TIlE1980s
ABSTRACT
TheFeldstein-Horioka finding, that national saving and investment have been
highly correlated in the past, has not been primarily due to econometric problems
such as endogenous fiscal policy; it has held up equally well when instrumental
variables are used. But the inflow of capital to the United States has been so large
in recent years that an updating of the sample period to 1987 produces a coefficient
on national saving that is lower than in past studies. This decline in the degree of
crowding out of investment can be attributed to the increased degree of financial
market integration in the 1980s. Capital controls and other bathers to the
movement of capital across national borders remained for such countries as the
United Kingdom and Japan as recently as 1979, and France and Italy as recently as
1986. But a new data set of forward exchange rates for 25countriesshows that a
continuing worldwide trend of integration of financial markets in the 1980s had all
but eliminated short-term interest differentials for major industrialized countries by
1988.
It is only the country premium that has been eliminated however, this
means that only covered interest differentials are small. Nominal and real exchange
rate variability remain, and indeed were larger in the 1980s than in the 1970s. The
result is that a currency premium remains, consisting of an exchange risk premium
plus expected real currency depreciation. The popular null hypothesis that expected
real depreciation is constant at zero is tested, and rejected, with a 119-year sample.
(Post-1973 data sets do not allow enough observations to provide a useful test of
this null hypothesis.) The existence of expected real depreciation means that, even
if interest rates are equalized internationally when expressed in a common currency,
large differentials in j interest rates remain. Investors have no incentive to
arbitrage away such differentials. Because there is no force tying the domestic real
interest rate to the world real interest rate, it follows that there is no reason to
expect any country's shortfalls of national saving to be completely financed by
borrowing from abroad.
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Feldetein and Horioka upset conventional wisdom in 1980
when they concluded that changes in countries' rates of
national savirg bad very large effect on their rates of
investment, arid interpreted this finding as evidence of low
capital mobility. Although their regressions bave been subject
to a great variety, of criticisms, their basic flniin seems to
bold .p. But does it iirly imperfect capital mobility?
Let us begin by king why we would ever expect a
shortfall in one country's national savingto reduce the
overall availability of funds and thereby crad cut investment
projects that might otherwise be undertaken in that country.
The aggregation together of all forms of "capital" has caused
more than the usual annunt of confusion in the literature on
international capital mobility.Nobody ever claimed that
international flats of foreign direct investment were large
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both of U.C. Berkeley, for research support.enough that a typical investtient project in the datestic
country would costless]-y be uzxiertaken directly by a foreign
company when there was a shortfall in dcttestic savirq)
Rather, the argument was that the typical Nterican corporation
could borrow at the goirg interest rate in order to finance its
investtant projects and, if the degree of capital biity were
sufficiently high, the goirg interest rate would be tied down
to the world interest rate by international flows of portfolio
capital.If portfolio capital were a perfect substitute for
thysical capital, then the differenoe nild be 3nnaterial; bit
the two types of capital probably are rrit in fact perfect
substitutes.
This paper examines a nwter of alternative ways of
opantifyirg the degree of international capital ntility. One
conclusion is that the barriers to cross-border flows are
sufficiently low that, by 1989, financial markets can be said
to be virtually cailetely intejrat& anor the large
irdustria]. countries (and ancn sane Enaller countries as
well).Bat this is a different prqDosition fran sayir that
real interest rates are equalized across countries, which is
still different fran sayirg that investment projects in a
country are unaffected by a shortfall in national savin. We
will see that there are several crucial links that can, and
probably do, fail to hold.
In many cases, notably the United Kixqlan and Japan (and
perhaps now Italy and France as well) the firdirq of high
2integration with world finarcial markets is a relatively na'
one, attribitable to liberalization prograns aver the last ten
years.Even in the case of financial markets littheUnited
States, integration with the Eurcnarkets appears to have been
incxrplete as recently as 1982 •2An important orclusion of
this paper for the United States is that the current accc*int
deficits of the 198 Os have been large eroagh, aM by rn have
lasted lor ena4, to reducesignificantly estimatesof the
correlation between saving aM invesbrt. This is true even
for time series that go back as far as the 1870s.The
increased degree of worldwide financial integration since 1979
is identified as one factor that has allowed such large capital
flows to take place over the past decaiD. at even if U.S.
interest rates are now viewed as tied to world interest rates3,
there are stillotherweak links in the chain. The implication
is that crowdirq out of domestic invesbient can still take
place.
1. Four Alternative fthitions of International jta].
Mobility
By the seooM half of the 1970s, international ecaticeists
had cate to speak of the world financial systan as
characterized by perfect capital mobility. In marty ways, this
was "jtmping the gun." It is true that financial integration
had been greatly enhanced after 1973 by the raicval of capital
3controls on the part of the United States, Gern'ariy, Canada,
Switzerlard an the Netherlards: by the steady process of
technical aid institutional innovation, particularly in the
Euromarkets: arci by the recycling of OPEC surpluses to
developirq countries,ait a]2rst all developing countries
retained extensive restrictions on international capita]. flows,
as did amajority of irdustrializedcountries. Even among the
five major countries without capital controls, capital was not
perfectly mobile by sane definitions.
There are at least four distinct definitions of perfect
capital mobility that are in widespread use.(I)The
Feldstein-Horioka definition:exogernis changes in national
saving (i.e., in either private savings or government budgets)
can be easily financed by borrowing fran abroad at the going
real interest rate, art thus need not cr1 out investment in
the originating country (except perhaps to the extent that the
country is large in world financial markets).(II)
interest parity:International capital flows ualize real
interest rates across countries.(III)Uncovered interest
parity:Capital flows ualize expected rates of return on
countries' bords, despite exposure to exchange risk.(IV)
Closed interest parity: Capital flows e4ualize interest rates
across countries when contracted in a oanrrn currency. These
four possible definitions are in ascerding order of
specificity. Only the last cordition is an unalloyed criterion
4for capital irbility in the sense of the degree of financial
market integration across national bairdaries. 4
As we will see each of the first three corditions, if it
is to hold, req.iires an auxiliary asstnrçtion in addition to the
cordition that follows it. Uncovered interest parity requires
not only closed (or covered) interest parity, bit also the
cordition that the exchange risk premium is zero.Real
interest parity requires not only uncovered interest parity,
but also the corxlition that eet&1 real depreciation is zero.
The Feldstein-Horioka cordition requires not only real interest
parity, bit also a certain cordition on the determinants of
investment.Bat even though the relevance to the degree of
integration of financial markets decreases as auxiliary
corrlitions are added, the relevance to questions regaxdirg the
origin of intertational payments imbalances increases.We
begin cur consideration of the various criteria of capital
ucbility with the Feldstein-Horioka definition.
2 Feldstein-Horioka Tests
The Feldstein-Horio]ca definition requires that the
country's real interest rate is tied to the rld real interest
rate by criterion (II);itis, after all, the real interest
rate rather than the nominal on tcfl savin ard investment in
theory deperd.Bat for criterion (I) to hold, it is also
necessary that any an all determinants of a country's rate of
5invesbnex* other than its real interest rate be uricorrelated
with its rate of national saving. tat the investment rate be
given by
(1)(I/Y)±=a-br+U,
where I is the level of capital formation, I is national
itput, r is the domestic real interest rate, ani u represents
all other factors, whether quantifiable or not, that detennine
the rate of investment. Feldstein aM Horioka (1980) regressed
the investhent rate against the national saving rate,
(1') (I/Y)iA+B(NS/Y)i+vi,
where NB is private saving minus the bxlget deficit. To get
the zero coefficient B that they were looking for requires not
only real interest parity:
(2)
(with the rld interest rate r* excqenous or in any other way
uncorrelatsi. with (NSf!) jj, but also a zero correlation between
uj aM (NS/Y)i.
2.1 The Saving-InvestlEnt literature
Feldstein aM Horioka' s firding that the coefficient B is
in fact closer to 1 than to zero has been reproduced many
tires. Most authors have not been willing, ha',ever, to fol1i
them in drawing the inference that financial markets are not
highly integrated. There have been many econometric critiques,
falling into t general categories.
6Itet anitnly made is the point that national saving is
eniogencus, or Inourtens is correlated with uj. This will
be the case if national savin and invesart are both
procyc].ical, as they are in fact Joiam to be, or if they both
respond to the popilatiat or productivity growth rates •5it
will also be the case if governnents resrd erogernis1y to
incipient cirrerxt acort IithaJ.ances with policiestodiange
piblic (or private) saving in such a way as to red'tre the
imbaj.ancss. This "policy reaction" argument has been made by
FieJ.eke(1982), 'Ithin (1983), Westjtal (1983), Capric aid
Howard (1984), Suimers (1988) and Rciubini. (1988). Thxt
Feldsteinand Horioka made an effort to handle the econaiietric
erdcgeneity of national saving, nnre so than have sane of their
critics.To handle the cyclical erdogeneity, they ccztp.ited
avenges over a long enough period of tine that business cycles
could be argued towashout.To handle other sources of
erdogeneity, they used deicgratic variables as instnunental
variablesfor the saving rate.
The other econcmetric critiqqe is that ifthe dcmestic
countryis large in world finamial markets, r* will not be
exogercus with resp&t to (NS/Y) j,andtherefore even ifr=r*,
r and inturn (1/1)i willbe correlated with (NS/Y)i. In other
words, a shortfall in danestic savirqs will drive up the world
interest rate, and thus craid out investment in the dcrestic
country as well as abroad. This "large—camtry" arg.nnent has
been made by Murçhy (1984)and Tctin (1983). An
7insufficiently-appreciated point is that the 1arge-irxtxy
argument does not create a prd1 in cross-section sbxlies,
because afl cntrrtries share the sane world interest rate fl.
since r* sfli1y goes into the constant term in a cross-section
regression, it cannot be the source of any correlation with the
rightbard-side variable.The large-countzy problat cannot
explain why the countries that are high-saving: relative to the
average taM to coincide with the camtries that are high-
investirg relative to the average.6
If the regressions of savirq aid investient rates were a
good test for barriers to finamial market integration, ore
would expect to see the coefficient fallirg over tine. Until
noc, the evidence has if anything: showed the coefficient rising
over ti rather than falling. This firdirg has eriergal both
fran cross-section studies, which typically report pre—ard
post—1973 results —Feldstein(1983), Penati aid Dooley
(1984), aid Dooley, FrarikeJ. aid Itthieson (1987) —aidfran
pore tine-series sti.dtes —CDbstfeld(1986a,b)7 aid Franks!
(.1986) for the United States. The ecornietric eidogeneity of
rational saving does not appear to be the explanation for this
fitting, because it holds &pally well when instrtmental
variables are used.8
The easy explanation for the firdirg is that, enntric
probleis aside, real interest parity —criterion(II) above—
has not held any better in recent years than it did in the
8past.Nishld.n (1984, 1352), for exaiiple, foist evene
significant rejections of real interest parity annrq major
jMustrialized x*rxtries for the floatirq rate period after
1973/11 than he did for his entire 1967/11—1979/Il sanple
period. Canaazza et al (1986, ç. 43-47) also fast that sn
of the major industrialized caintries in the 1980s (1980.1—
1985.6) ixned farther frcr real interest parity than they had
been in the 1970s (l973.7—l979.12). In the early 1980s, the
real interest rate in the Unitel States, in particular, rcee
far above the real interest rate of its major tradinj partners,
by any of a variety of nEasures.1°If the domestic real
interest rate is not tied to the foreign real interest rate,
then there is no reason to expect a zero coefficient in the
savirq—investnent regression. We discuss inalater section
the factors urderlyin real interest differentials.
2.2 The U.S. savim-investnsnt regressicqj3ated
Sirce 1980 the massive fiscal experlm't carried ait urder
the Reagan Mministration has been rapidly wderninlxg the
statistical firñirg of a high savirq—investnent correlation for
the case of the United States. The increase in the structural
budget deficit, which was neither accxntdatal by ncxnetary
policy nor finarted by an increase in private savirq, reduced
the national savin rate by 3 per cent of QIP, relative to the
1970s. The investment rate —whichat first, like the savirq
9rate,fell in the 1981—82 recession —hadby 1988
approximately reattained ità1980level at best. The saving
shortfall. was made up, necessarily, by a flood of borrcwirq
frt abroad equal to more than three per cent of Q1P. Hence
the current acxxirit deficit of $161 billion in 1987.(By
contrast, the U.S. current aoccunt balance was on average equal
to zero in the 19705.)
By rat, the divergence between U.S. national saving aid
investnent has been sufficiently large aM long-lasting to sbai
up in longer-ten regressions of the Feldstein-Horioka type.
If one seeks to isolate the degree of capital mobility or
cr'ing cutforthe United States in particular, aidbow it
has changed over tine, then tineseriesregression is necessary
(whereas if oneisconcerned with suchneasureeworldwide, then
cross-section regressions of the sort perforn by Feldstein
aidHorio]caare better).Table 1 reports instrumental
variables regressions of invesbient against national saving for
the UnitedStatesfran1870to1987.12 rc&3aaveragesare
used for each variable, which rwves sate of the cyclical
variation batgivesus only 12 observations. (Yearly data are
notin any case available before 1930.)That isone more
observation than was available in Frankel (1986, Table 2 •2),
which went only thravjh the 1970's. Figure 1 plots the decMe
data.
As before, the coefficient is statisticallygreater than
zeroaid isnotstatistically different fran 1, stqgesting a
10Table 1 'THE"FELDSTEIN-}IORIOICA COEFFICIENT" BY DECADES: 1869-1927
In.tru.istallariabla Reqr.saias of (1.5. Isoutaunt against National Saving (as shares of aNP)
Tin IriS
(A Ourbin—liatsasAotoraqrnaivq
lusstant Coufficirit Caifficiunt Statistic Paraautr
1. 0,411 0.976 1.45 0.96
(1.340) 1.0861
2. 3.324 0.785 0.46 0.97
(1.042) (.110L- L331
3. 3.291 0.354 -0.011 0.73 0.92
(6.1761 (.279) (.0210
1.061 0.924 0.001 0.03 0.96
(1.5071 (.0931 (.0051 (0.081
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12CDt1PARINGT REGRESSIONS BEFORE AND AFtER 1°S0
Table 2: THE FELDSTEINHORIOKA COEFFICIENT BY YEARS: 1929-1997
Instrumental Variables Regresrion c-f U.S. Investment 'qiinst
National Saving (as shares of GNP) -!
DL:rbin—WatscnAutra;rtssiva
Constant Coeicient Statistic Parameter
1929—B? 2.99 0.79 0.64 0.94
• (.89) (.06)
1930—97 4.95 0.67 0.77 0.95
(2.61) (.19) .09)
1929-79 1.99 0.86 131 0.97
(.61) (.04)
2.00 0.95 0.38 0.95
(.66) (.05) (.13)
1980-87 13.73 0.15 2.09 0.17
(3.85) (.27);
1991-87 —0.36 :0.03 —0.37 0.00
(.56) (.02) NotConverged
Table3: THE FELDSTEIN-HORIOKA COEFFICIENT BY YEARS: 1955-1987
Instrumental Variables Regression o+ U.S. Investment against
National Saving (aa sharSofGNP and
CyclicallyAdjusted) --
Durbin—WatsonAutormgrsaslve
Constant Cceficient Statistic Parameter




1956—79 —0.57 1.C! 0.25 0.70
(.19) (.i9) (.20)
-
.:198087 -0.39 0.13 2.46 0.30t
36) C Ii)
1981-87 0.59 0.22 —O.i 0.34: (.37) -:(.16)
*Constanttermisautomatically zero because cyclically adjusted rates are
residuals from a 1955—1987 regression against the OW? gap.8
0
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1955Table 2a: COMPARING REGRESSIONS BEFORE AI1D AFTER 1958
Regressionsof Irvest.ent against Watinnal Saving lOom as Shares




1930—V 4.847 0.669 0.77 0.89
12.611) (.1871 (.09)
1930—97 4.108 0.569 0.004 0.60 - 0.91
(2.033) (.209) (.0021 (.11)
1930-59 2.174 0.823 0.38 0.95
(.8271 (.0691 (.181
19597 (6.193 1.14 1.00
(12.8441 (.1591 (.005)
Table3a: COMPARING REGRESSIONS BEFORE AND AFTER 1974
Regressionsof Investmentagainst Natial Saving (Oathas
CyclicallyAdjusted Shares of SN?), Yearly Data, [95517 Instrumental Variables
useTrend
in Durbin—Wetsnn Autoregressive
Constant Coefficient Coefficient Statistic Parameter
1955-87 -0.058 0.96 0.26
(.2491
1956—87 —0.026 0.50 0.42
(.261) (.151
1956—37 -0.(37 0.476 —0.013 0.52
1.3021 (.048) (.0261 (15)
1956—73 —0.135 0.872 0.25 0.73
(.1401 (.1531 (.23)
1975—8? 0.57! 0.3(1 0.24 0.36
(.3051 (.156) (.341high degree of czatnj at (or a lat degree of capital
ncbiity, in Feldstein ant Horioka' s tens).Thit the point
estimate of the coefficient (when correcting for possible
serial correlation) drops fran .91 in the earlier st4y to .79.
We can alla for a tiixe trent in the coefficient;it drops
fran p]j .01 a year in the earlier stisly to minus .01 a year
(or plus .001, when correcting for serial correlation) in the
longer san].e. Thus the additional years 1980—1987 do sba up
as anticipated: as ethibitirq a later U.S. degree of cradirq
cnt, even if the change is small.[The treni is mt
statistically significant, bit this is rct surprising given the
small rnzter of &servations. 3
A data set that begins later waild seem ncre pranisirq
than the 12 decade averages. Table 2 reports regressions for
yearly data beginning in 1930.)kich of the variation in the
yearly data is cyclical, so Table 3 uses savixq ant investtent
rates that have been cyclically adjusted, for a sample pericd
that begins in 1955.[The cyclical adjustnt of each is
accomplished by first regressing it on the QIP gap, defined as
the percentage deviation fran the flireau of Economic Analysis's
"middle eansion treni" of QIP, ant taking the residuals.]
In previais K)rk with a sample pericd of 1956—1984, the
coefficient in a regression of cyclically adjusted saving ant
investment rates was estimated at .80,statistically
irdistirquishable from 1. (Frankel(1986, 43—44)). Bit nat the
coefficient has dropped essentially to zero, suggestin a zero
11degree of crcx4irg o.it, or a zero degree of "savirq—retenticrt"
(or, in the Feldstelfl-HoriOka tenirr'lw,"perfect capital
iility"). This firdin is the result of the addition to the
sarple of artther three years of record current account
deficits, 1985-87, a periodalso in which the cyclically
adjustednational savirq rate was historicafly low. When the
uation is estiiriated with an allowarte for a tiite trend in the
coefficient, the trend is negative (thaigh statistically
insignificant), whereas the earlier sanple that stopped in 1984
showed a tine trend that was positive (aid. insignificant).
Figure 2 (or Figure2afor the cyclically adjusted data) iTake
clear how farbeyond previous experience were the downturns in
U.S. national saving ard the current annt in the 1980s.
To verify that the 198Os experience is ireed the source
ofthe precipitous fall in the savirg-investnent ooeffioient,13
the satple periodis split at 1980. For the period 1955-79,
not only is the coefficient statisticallyinlistiruishable
frrn 1, but the point estinate isslightly 1.14 It is
clearly the unprecedented deve1opints of the present decade
that have overturned the hitherto-robust saving-investment
relationship for the case ofthe UnitedStates.Itis likely
that finarcia].liberalization inJapan,the United Xirdan, aid
othercountries, aid continued innovation in the Eurcrarkets
(aid perhaps the 1984 repeal of the U.S. withholdirg tax on
bonwirg frau abroad), have resulted in a higher degree of
capital nc'biity, aid thereby facilitated the record flow of
12capita]. to tiw United States in the 1980s. kit the magnithde
of the infics Is in the first inatance attrthitable to the
unprecedented nagnitude of the dec]irie in national saving.15
3. Differentials iii xpected Rates ofeturn. and Lcpeced Real
If the goal is to sure the degree of integration of
capital markets, rather than the degree to which deases in
national saving have aaded azt investhient, then it is better
to look at differences in rates of retirn aacse countries
rather than lookixg at saving-investiant correlations?6 at
measuring zJ. interest differentials will not do the trick.
An international investor, when deciding what ortzy' s assets
tobiy,will not rpare the interest rates in different
countries each expressed in tens of expected pirthasirg paier
over that country's goods. When he or she thinks to evaluate
assets in terms of purchasing pcser, all assets will be
evaluated in tens of the sam basket, the one consumd by that
particular investor.The expected inflation rate then drcçs
at of differentials in expected rates of return assets.
The differential in expected rates of return on two
countries •bardsis the uncovered interest differential, the
mninal interest differential minus the expected charqe in the
13extharqe rate: i— i* — (e,depr). If asset denards
are hi'1y sensitive to eqsta rates of return, then the
differential will be zero, which gives us urcoverel interest
parity:
(3) i—i*— (expdepr) =0.
To distirquish this parity ctnlition, which is Criterion (III)
above, fran the other definitions, it has often been designat
"perfect substitutability:" rct only is there little in the
narmer of transactions ooets or goverrmient-bpoeedtrols to
separate national markets, hit also danestic-airrercy ard
foreign-airrency bords are perfect substitutes in investors'
portfolios.
Just as Criterion (I)is considerably stronger than
Criterion (II), so is Criterion (II) considerably stronger than
Criterion (III). For real interest parity to bold, one mist
have riot only uzvered interest parity, hit an &ZJ.tional
coniition as well, which is sacet±ies cailsi ex ante relative
purchasing patier parity:
(2') exp depr —expintl -eçinfl*.
Equation (2') ardeciyation (3) together imply equation (2). If
goods markets are perfectly interate5, meaning not only that
there is little in the manner of transportation costs or
govennent—i1Dosai barriers to separate national markets, tnt
also that danestic ard foreign goods are perfect substitutes in
consumers' utility furctions, then pirchasirig pa1'er parity
holds.Purchasing paier parity (PPP) in turn inplies (2').
14Sit asis by rai we1l—)an, goods markets are itt 'In fact
perfectly integrated. Because ofthe possibilityofexpected
realdepreciation, real. interest parity can fail even if
criterion (3)holdsperfectly. The reniain1er ofthis section
considersthe question whether ex ante relative PPP, equation
(2'), holds.
The ezrnns real awreciation of the dollar in the early
198 Os aid subseqient real depreciation have by na cawinced
the reiainirg daibters, hit abzx3arit statistical evidei
againstPPP was there all alorq. Knman (1978, p.406), for
exanple,ocrpited for the floatirq rate period July 1973-
Decwber 1976 staniard deviations of the (logarithmic) real
exchange rate equal to 6.0 per cent for the paird/dollar rate
aM8.4per cent for the mark/dollar rate. He also ccrpited
serial correlation coefficients for PPP deviations of •897aid
.854, respectively, on a inthly basis, equal to .271 aM .150
on an annual basis. The serial correlation coefficient is of
interest because it is equal to ons minis the speed of
adjusbent to PPP. It may be best itt to rely exclusively on
thestardard deviation of the real exchange rate as a sunxy
statistic for the degree of Integration of goods markets,
because it in part reflects the magnitude of retary
disturbances durirg the period.17
Table4sha.ss upiatel annual statistics on the real
exchange rate between the United States aid Great Britain.
15Diring the floating rate period 1973—1987,thaxhthere is m
significantthis trend,there is a large staniard error of 15 • 6
per cent. The serial correlation in the deviations frcn PPP is
estixnatel at .687,witha stardard error of .208. (The
ecipation estimated is (ert+l - rt÷i) = R(ert - &t), where er
is the real exchange rate, is the long-nm eopilibritmi
level, alternatively estiiiiatel as the sample maan or a tima
trend, and AR is the autoregressive coefficient.] This users
that the estimated speed of adjusisnt to PPP is .313 per year,
aid that one can easilyrejectthe hypothesis of instarutarsaus
adjusbnent.
ftan the ashes of absolute PPP, a r&enix has risen. In
response to tiMings sudt as those reported here, sais authors
have swwq frau a•a extre, the prcposition that the teniercy
of the real exdiarge rate to return to a constant is ccrplete
art instantaneaus, to the oosite euctrn that there is rc
auth terx3.ercy at all. The hypothesis that the real exchange
rate follais a reMan walk is just as good as the hypothesis of
absolute PPP for iwplyirg ex ante relative PPP. tit there is
even less of an a priori case why PPP shcnld hold in rate-of-
charge font than in the level form.
Even thoi4s ex ante relative PPP has little basis in
theory, it does aear to have sais etpirical suport.
Typically, the estimated speeds of thjustsnt during the
floati.rg rate period, .31 in Table 4 (1973-1987), while wt so
























(0Table 4: Purchasing Power Parity Between the United States and the United Kingdom
1869 -1987
1973-87 1945-72 1945-87 1869-87
Statistics on Percent
Deviation from Mean
Mean AbsoluteDeviation .120 .074 .110 .093


















































*Significant at the 95 percent level.
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
a. With constant term and correction for autocorreletion,so 1w that ae statistically cannot reject the hypothesis that
they are zero.In other words one cambot reject tie rardan-
walkhypothesis that the autoregression coefficient is 1.0.
A 95-percent ifidence interval at the autoregressive
coefficientcovers the rarge 0.27-1.10.If the null hypothesis
is an autoregressive coefficient of 1.0, one cannot
legitimatelyuse the stardar t-test derived fran a regression
where the ri4thard-side variable is the level ofthereal
exoharge rate, because wder the null hypothesis the variaite
is infinite.[This does not invalidate the t-test just
reported ofthenull hypothesis that the terdenoy toretn to
PIPwas 100percent,that is,A.)There are a nuiter of
waysofdealirgwith this nonstatiaiarity preblem. Here at
simplyapplies the corrected Dickey—Ft]ller 95-percent
significarce level, 3.00 •The.31 estimate for the floatirg—
rateperiod is irtignificantly different fran zero.
Thisfailure torejecta rardcin walk in the real exr￿iange
rate isthesane result faintbyTh11(1979), FrenJcel(1981,
p.69), Adleraid Lehman (1983),Deity (1981), Misbkin(1984,
pp.1351—53),aid Piott aid Sweeney (1985).Mostof these
studiesused nc'nthly data.on the one hard, the greater
aburdance of data reduces the staidard error of the estimate
hat,on the other bard, one is no lager testin whether AR —
.69is different fran 1.0, xxt rather whether .97 {—1—((l—
AR)/12])is differentfrau 1.0, so that itmaynot be nfl
easierto reject. Another problem isthat at does not )anz
17that the nature ofthe true autoregressive ooess is truly
first-order on a rthly (or caxtinua.is-time)basis.In any
case,the rthly data in the studies citelweregenerally not
powerful eragh to reject the rardcin wal]c.18
A nore prcanisirq alternative is to choose a longer tb
sample to get a nore powerful estimate. Table 4 also reports
statistics for the entire postwar period 1945-1987. PFP held
better for the Bretton Woods years than it did after 1973, as
nisasureleither by the mean absolute deviation aid stardard
deviation of the real exchange rate, or by the ability to
reject the hypothesis of zero autocorrelaticn.&zt, despite
the longer ti sanpie,one isonly at the borderlire of being
abletoreject the rarxiozn walk.The 95—percent ctnfidenoe
interval for AR runs frr 0.64to 1.02 [or 0.52 to0.96, when
aflowirqfora trerd in the long-runequilibrium], ard the t-
ratioof 1.85 [or 2.56, when allowing for the treid] falls
short of the Dickey-FUler 95-percent significai level of
2.93.
The stardard error of an estimate of AR isapproxinately
the square root of (l-AR2)/N.So ifthetrue speed of
adjusthentisonthe ozr of 30 per cent a year (AR =.7),we
'wild raipire at least 49yearsof data (2.932(l_.72)/(l_.7)2 s
48.6)to be able torejectthe null hypothesis of AR =1.It
isnotvery surprisln that 43yearsof data isnotern4i,
nathlessthe 15 years ofdataused in nost studies)9
The last coBr ofTable4presentsan entire 119years of
18U.S. -U.K. data. With this lcn a ti saup].e, the stardard
error' is red'r&t considerably.The rejection of m serial
correlation in the real ecbame rate is even strorger than in
the shorter tine sazp].es. 1e inportantly, an is finally
able to detect a statistically significant terderry for the
real extharx?a rate to regress to PPP, at a rate of 16 per cent
a year. The rfidsnoe interval for R rw's fran 0.75 to 0.94,
safely less than wiity, aM the t-zutio of 3.12 e,ceeds the
Dickey-Fuller significance level of 2.8g.20The U.s.,'u.x.
realexsthane rate is plotted inFigure3, for all 118 years.
The last iw of the table reports regressions of the real
exoharge rate against the mama! extharge rate. The
coefficient is highly significant for all tine sauples. The
figures aqgest that tharqes in the ncnlnal rate (due, for
example, to devaluations urder fixed extharqe rates or retary
disturbances urder flcatirg eatarge rates) in the preserte of
sticky goods prices cause transitory thargee in the real
excharge rate.Such results specifically rule cut the
possibility, which has been occasionally aqgested in the past,
that apparent deviations fran PPP might be attrlhited to
(rardcin) neasurennnt errors in the price data.21
The ,tivation for lookirg at PPP in this section has been
to obtain insight into the expected rate of real depreciation,
because that is the variable that can give rise to real
interest differentials even in the presence of uzwvered
interest parity. In rejectirq the rardan walk desa'ipti*t of
19the real. excbange rate, one has rejected the claim that the
raticriafly tçected rate of real depreciaticr is zero.22
take an ele, in .1983—84, whet the dollar had awreciated
sa 30 percent above its PPP value, survey data shai expected
f.xbare real depreciation of 4.3 percent per year. It is thus
wt difficult to lain the existence of the U.S. real
interest differential, even withait açealirq to any sort of
risk priint.There is littleecusefor authors such as
Itraczyk(1985, p.350) aid rarby (1986, p.420) rulirg out the
possibility of expected realdepreciation a priori aidthereby
concludirq that real interest differentials id.1y
constititerisk preniins.
If the failure of ex ante relative pirthasixq pr parity
nld,initself, explain the failure of real interest parity,
then it oculd also, by itself, explain the failure of savirq
aid Investhient to be urcorrelatsi.In the rert U.S.
context, a fall in national savirg caild cause an iiease in
the real interest differential aid therefore a fall in
investuent, even if .financialmarkets are perfectly integrated
aid even if the fail in savim is truly eogernas, provided the
real interest differential is associated with expected real
depreciation of the dollar.
Dacinstratin that the failure of ex ante relative
pirchasirg pa'i'er parity is capable of prodirin a cutrelatiat
between savirg aid investnent is, of cane, mt the sans thirq
20as assertirq that this in fact is the explanation for tin
corr&.ation.There are plenty àf other cnzpetiTq
explanatin that have been proposed. ait s suçort for tin
idea that tin ead.stez of expecta3. real dqareciaticn Ag key to
the thserval correlation frauC.ardia (1988).
sinilates saving aid investnent rates in a sequer of iixxlels
featuring shocks to fiscal s'pen3.lrq, uaiey growth, aid
productivity, in order to see whith wdels are capable, for
erpiricafly-relevant uiagnitthes of the parameters, of producing
savln-invesbiwt correlations as high as those thserval. It
get at scne of the explanations that have been ucst pnninent2y
proposed, she oawtructs itdels both with art witFn.rt
purchasirg power parity, both with aid witlr.rt ertgernis
response of fiscal policy to ain'ent actt iita].arces, ard
both with aid withc'xt the snsfl—cc*zritry assumption.'fln
fiidirq is that the nrde]. that allan for deviatimn fran
pirthasing parer parity is able to explain savin-investht
correlations as high as ore, while the variais ndels that
impose pirchasirq power parity are generally not as able to do
23
4 A Decaicoeition of al Interest Di! fe&entjals for 25
Oanitries
Because there are so many ocxupetirg definitiais of the
21degree of international capitalncbility, itwould be worth
?aciowin if the sort of countries that register high by ons
criterion are also the sort that register high by the others.
In this section we look at rates of return in the l9SOs across
a sample of 25 countries. We begin with the broadest iteasure
of barriers to international capital ntbility, the differential
in real interest rates, defined as:
(4) r—r*= (i-'expinfl) —(i*—expinfl*).
Subsequently we will decoiqpose the real interest
differential into a cononent due to "political" or country
factors arid a caçonent due to currency factors:
(5)r_r*=(i_i*_fd)+(fd_expinfl+expiflfl*),
when i is the domestic nominal interest rate, i* is the
foreign nominal interest rate,andfdisthe forward discount
on the datestic currency. The first tenu (i -i*-fd)is the
covered interest differential. We call it the political or
cxtntry premium because it captures all barriers to integration
of financial markets across national bctniaries: transactions
costs, information costs, capital controls, tax laws that
discriminate by country of residence, default risk, and risk of
future capital controls. The second term could be described as
the real forward discount.We call it the currency premium
because it captures differences in assets according to the
currency In which they are denominated, rather UanIn terms of
the political jurisdiction In which they are issued. As we
will see, the currency premium can in turn be deccriposed Into
22ttt factors, the extharqe risk premium ard ected real
depreciation.
The deccuzpositicn of the real interest differential ild
not be possible withait the use of data at forward exthange
rates. Marty previous st4ies have usat forward rate data to
test covere interest parity, bit ai].y for a far countries.
The present stdy uses forward rate data for panel of 25
countries, which so far as I lcrw is the largest set ever
examined.The set of 25 irclt.xles cnritries both large aid
in1 1, lntzstrializel ard develcpinj, Atlantic aid Pacific.
The forward rate data for ncst of the axintries ca fran
Barclay's Bank in tcnon, via tta Resources, Irc.24
4 •1Real. interest differentials
Thble 5 reports statistics at tbree-un'tth real interest
differentials for the 25 countries, in each case expressed as
the local, interest rate reasurM relative to the Euzol1ar
interest rate. Pbr local interest rates we use the irrtetharik
market rate or, where no market rate exists, the ucst flexibly—
deterinirt interest rate available.25 We use, to begin with,
the realized inflatiat rates during the ex post three-ircmth
period. OD11.nnn (1) reports the nean real interest
differential during the sample period, September 1,982 to
January 1988.(In this aid subsequent tables, because the ex
post data rm three naths behlsd the ex ante expectations,
23they to. April 1988.)The nu±ers are naative for a
majority of rutries, averagirq —1.74 aoss all 25,tint
reflects the high level of real dollar interest rates durlzg
this period.
The caintries are classified into five grace thosen ata
priorigrc*nls.fl graip with real interest rates the
farthestbelwthe world rats is Babrain, Grsec*, Msxicx,
Portbgal aid Satth Africa. fle five (very diverse) azitries
bear the bnden of represettirq a wide class of LDC in air
sauple.Altogether there are eight cxxzrztrise classified as
IflS that hawen to have forward rate data available, aid
thereby appear in air sle; three of tIe are Bast Asian
cairxtries that are thoufl'it to have open financial markets in
the 198 Os (Horn Icorq, Sinjapore aid Malaysia) aid so are here
classified separately.
C'm might cbj ect that the large neative real interest
differentials In the gra of five reflect aôninistered lnl
interest rates that are kt artificially 1w by "financial
repressiat" Bit ortries canixit naintain artificially 1w
interest rates witinit harriers to capital outf 1w. 'fls
statistia reflect a 1w degree of capital urtility precisely
as we iant thea to.In this respect air graip of five is
typical of ID(.Amrber of studies, frcltdirg iufli larger
Inc samples than available here, have shc*in the extremes to
which real interest rates can go, partiamlarly s very
negativ levels In the l970s.
24As with the atSr sures of Interest rate differentials
that we will be cxrisidering belw, the nean is itt aliays the
st useful statistic. A Riflhl mean aver a partiaa].ar saqls
periodmey hide flt.cbatia in both directions. Even if a
mean is statistically significant,26 it is useful to Janr in
addition the variability of the differential.The stardard
deviation is reporta in lini (2). We also report the root
mean sgiared error in coltmn (3).(This taild be a superior
measure of how closely the rates are Ue together if, for
exanpie, we are nriat abcxzt the possibility of a large
differential that is fairly caristant aver time because of
govennt administration of Interest rates.]Finally we
report in oo].unn (4) 1n big a bard lrnild be rn1nd to
ercazçass 95 percent of the deviations fran real interest
parity.
Cantry-graip ozçarisons of the measures of real interest
differential variability in sn respects aät a iriori
expectations: the five closal IDCs ocristitite the graip with
the highest variability, aM the five open Atlantic ca2ntries
the graip with the Latest.27Sit there are sate results that
are amalas if the real Interest differential is taken as a
neasare of finaxr.ial market integration. Frai, for exanp].e,
had stringent capital oorxtro].s in place durln air sample
period (at least until the latter part] aM yet aars to have
a higher degree of capital ñdiity by the criteriai of real
interest differential variability than Japan, whith arnuirced
25liberalization ofits capital controls before air sample period
(1979-80).Ce mightconcaivably argue that the Japanese
libe.ralization nist not have been genuine. Bit the Frendi. real
interest differentiaJ. is smaller art less variable even than
those of the Netherlards art Switzerlard, major cx*intries that
are ]acw.'n to be virtually free of capital controls.Only
Canada shows a smaller art less variable real interest
differential than Fraire.
Because the realized lMlaticn rates caild not have been
precisely krnin a priori, Table 5a projects than on three
contaxporaneais variables:the forward disx*mt, rntiinal
interest differential, art lagged inflation differential. In a
majority of cases, a statistically significant airmt of the
variation in the real interest, differential is forecastable.28
The staniaxd deviation of the projected differential gives us
air finaJ. asure of variability. The results for the ex ante
real interest differential are itly sizilar to those for the
ex post. France, for example, still shows a lower degree of
variability than the Netherlards.
4.2 Cvere&jrrterest differentials: The ctuntrv nrsmitn
We useUs Barclay's forward rate data to decerpose
the real interest differential into one part due to caintry
factors art another due to airrency factors, as in equation
(5). The first canponent, the covered interest differential,
26emasses all factas related to the political jurisdictiat
in which the asset is issued.Its size ard variability
measure barriers to interrationa]. capital ncility ncst
narrowly ard prcçerly defined. Plots of the covered interest
differentials for each of the 25 countries in the 1980s are
shown in Figure4.
Column (1) of Table 6 reportsthemean of the covered
interest differential for each of our 25 countries. A gocd
rule of thumb, when the absolute magnibde of the mean or the
variability of the differential irdicates the existence of
significant barriers, is as follows: a negative differential
via-a-via theEurcairrerry market irdicates that, to the extent
thatbarriers exist, they arecapitalcontrols or transactions
costs aintntly operatirg todiscouragecapital franflowirq
outof the country.Investors wwld notsettlefor a lower
return donastically if they were free toearnabroad the higher
return covered to eliminate excthane risk. This is the case
for alltheLDCs in the sample, with the eception of Hag
Kong, ard for all of the traditionally "closed" Eircpean
cnnitries, with the ecepticms of Austria ard Belgium (which
should by r prthably be classified with the "cpen"
countries).The negative differential that existed for the
united Kir*gdan before Margaret Thatcher rwved capital
controls in 1979 is zn' extrenely small.Slatlarly, Canada's
differential is effectively zero (as shown, e.g., by Boothe, et
al,1985, p.112].
27Table 5: REAL INTEREST DIFFERENTIALS (local mj:ula Eurodollar; 3-mo. rates
Interest Differential Less Realized Inflation Differential
September, 1982 to January, 1988
1 2 3 4
Series Root Mean
* of Standard Standard Squared
Obs. Mean Error Deviation Error 95K Sand
Open Atlantic DCs
Canada 63 0.09 0.38 2.09 2.09 3.96
Germany 63 —1.29 0.65 2.77 3.06 5.95
Netherlands 62 -0.71 0.96 3.91 3.97 7.69
Switzerland 62 —2.72 0.81 9.39 4.36 8.43
United Kingdom 63 0.46 0.79 3.45 3.48 5.69
Group 313 —0.83 0.66 3.16 3.46
Liberalizing Pacific LDCs
Hong Kong 62 -2.89 0.94 4.80 5.62 11.61
Malaycia 420.83 1.00 4.61 4.68 8.19
Singapore 610.09 0.68 3.33 3.34 6.71
Group 185 —0.67 0.82 4.28 4.42
Clomed LDCs
Sahrain 60 2.19 1.46 7.10 7.44 12.93 -.
Greece 56 —9.22 1.91 9.36 13.19 21.77
Mecico 62 —20.28 9.43 21.19 29.45 52.13
Portugal 61 —3.90 2.97 11.28 11.95 23.62
South Africa 61 —4.84 1.17 4.85 6.88 11.16
Group 300 —7.35 1.30 12.16 16.06
Closed European DCs
--Austria 64 —2.20 0.83 3.84 4.43 7.32
Selgiue 630.53 0.69 2.90 2.95 4.99
Denmark âi —3.42 0.90 4.34 5.54 9.64
France 64 —0.48 0.72 2.94 2.98 5.54
Ireland 61 1.53 1.03 3.95 4.24 7.13
Italy 61 1.01 0.86 3.62 3.76 5.83
N4oraay 500.64 0.84 3.23 3.29 6.93
Spain 630.53 1.44 5.92 5.95 11.90
SNaden 630.21 1.07 4.52 4.53 8.29
8roup 550 —0.37 0.91 4.00 .4.29
Liberalizing Pacific DC
Auatralia 6CV1.16 0.90 3.69 3.97 7.43
Japan 43 —0.58 0.42 3.41 3.46 6.02
New Zealand 60 1.04 1.83 7.15 7.23 11.36
Group 1830.52 0.73 5.00 5.09
All Countries 1531 —1.74 6.47 9.0'?Table Sa: PROJEChON OF REAL INTEREST DIFFERENTI
(to find exante differential and its standard deviation)
CCUNT2I
Cceffi:iente ?recledddjusted
4cY Furwardiiiterest 1M1atin CMStandard 2
OtsCenstant flisreunt Differritifliffnranti OulueDeviationSquared
CANADA 63 0.17 -0.48 0.83 —0,26 2.59 0.56-0.06
6EPN1U 63 8.07 1.71 -0.70 —0.27 8.50 * 1.47 0.13
NETNERLA 623.7! • 1.92 —0.30 —0.0424.33 ; 2.53 0.34
SMITZE4 62 3.00 2.67 —1.79 0.35 14.66 a2.09 9.3!
Ut1iED K 43 1.63 3.12 F-3.21 * 0.33 14.79 a 1.37 0.19
O3&ON 62 —1.11 -1.43 2.74 -0.53 6.03 * 1.62 0.01
9LA'fSI4 62 1.30 —0.031.0 —0.09 11.14 I 2.43 o.1E
S1NSF0R SI .57 0.34 0.31 0.42 0.84 0.55-0.11
8AtXR1 60 2.22 0.40 -0.09-0.74 2.22 1.96-0.05
GREECE So-17.56 -0.40 0.89 0.62 4.87 3.19 0.11
MEXICO 43—15.92 -0.79 * 1.05 0.06 10.70 * 9.86 0.38
PORIJOSAL 59-v.92 —:0.25 2.45 •-1.06 *20.43I731 0.38
SOUH 61 .25 0.00 0.39 -0.79 a13,34 3.24 0.40
AUSTRfl 62 0.71 0.30 0.76 -0.83 4.98 L56 0.06
8ELSIU 63 1.42 * 0.72-0.33 -0.87 18.79 1.87 0.33
DENflARK 31 -1.07 -0.23 1,42 I 0.'iá 6.73 1.93 0.12
FRANCE 64 0.02 -0,73 2.28 a-0.73 i45.16 * 2.30 0.55
IRELAND 593. * v.12 0.32 -1.01 a41.76 * 3.15 0.58
ITALY 61 —0.84 —0.86* 1.35 I-0.66 *19.23 2.40 0.36
MORMAY 50 —0.25 —2.31a 2.60 * 0.3i 7.61 1.43 0.11
SPAU3 63-3.75 -3.70 *i,3 -0.2327.76 I 4.22 0.44
SWEDEN 63-4.23 *-Lvi* 4.*5+-0.14 16.11 * 2.69 0.26
kJ3FALi 60 -1.14 -v.28 0.63 0.12 3.96 1.52 0.06
2APAU 63 3.24 3.61 -2.39 0.26 7.13 1.32 0,03
9CM ZEAL 6') -5.66 0.58-(4 0.76 7.22 3.65 0.16
* Statistically significant at 95% level
(using Hansen—Hodricic standard errors)Table 6: 'CODNTRY PRE14IA" OR COVERED INTEREST DIFFERENTIALS
(local minus Eurodollar; 3—month rates)
Interest Differential Less Forward Discount
September, 1982 to April, 1988
1. 2 3 4
Series Root Mean
4*of Standard Standard Squared
Obs. Mean Error Deviation Error95'!. Band
Open Atlantic DCs
Canada 68 —0.10 0.03 0.21 0.24 0.44
Germany 680.35 0.03 0.24 0.42 0.75
Netherlands 680.21 0.02 0.13 0.25 0.4Z
Switzerland 680.42 0.03 0.23 0.49 0.79
United Kingdon 65 —0.14 0.02 0.20 0.25 0.41
Group 340 0.14 0.01 0.21 0.34
Liberalizing Pacific LDC5
Hong Kong 680.13 0.03 0.28 0.31 0.60
Malaysia 63 —1.46 0.16 1.28 1.95 3.73
Singapore 64 —0.30 0.04 0.31 0.43 0.73
Group 195 —0.52 0.05 0.75 1.14
Closed LDCs
Bahrain 64 —2.15 0.13 1.06 2.41 4.17
Greece 58 -9.39 0.80 6.08 11.26 20.39
Mexico 43 —16.47 1.83 12.01 20.54 28.86
Portugal 617.93 1.23 9.59 12.49 27.83
South Africa 67 —1.07 1.17 9.55 9.61 2.69
Group 293 -6.84 0.48 8.23 11.82
Closed European DCo
Austria 650.13 0.05 0.39 0.41 0.39
Pelgium 890.12 0.02 0.26 0.29 0.59
Denmark 68 —3.53 0.19 1.57 2.89 6.63
Prance 69 —1.74 0.22 2.68 3.20 7.18
ireland 66 —0.79 0.51 4.17 4.24 7.80
Italy 89 —0.40 0.23 1.92 1.96 4.11
Norway 50 —1.03 0.11 0.78 1.29 2.10
Spain 67 —2.40 0.45 3.46 4.39 7.9s
Sweden 68 —0.23 0.06 0.45 0.51 0.81
Group SaS —1.10 0.09 2.25 2.77
Liberaliring Pacific DC5
Australia 68 —0.75 0.23 1.94 2.09 2.59
Japan 680.09 0.03 0.21 0.23 0.43
New Zealand 68 —1.63 0.29 2.42 2.92 5.24
Group 204 —0.76 0.12 1.78 2.06
All Countries 1620 —1.72 0.09 3.81 5.36• Table 7 "CURRENCY PREMIAKORREM4 FORWARD DISCOUNTS
Forward Discount Less Realized Inflation Differential
September, 1982 to January, 1988
1 2 3 4
3erie Root Mean
*of StandardStandard Squared
abs. Mean Error Deviation Error 95% Band
Open Atlantic DCs
Canada 63 0.18 0.38 2.08 2.09 4.02
Germany 63 —1.66 0.69 2.89 3.34 6.57
Netherlands 62 -0.92 0.88 3.98 4.09 7.52
SHitzerland 82 —3.15 0.94 3.49 4.72 9.79
United KIngdom 630.61 0.83 3.56 3.61 5.97
Group 313 —0.98 0.89 3.24 3.65
Liberalizing Pacific LDCs
Hong Kong 62 —2.99 0.92 4.79 5.66 11.76
Malaysia 422.29 1.14 5.06 5.56 10.17
Singapore 62 0.40 0.67 2.32 2.35 6.86
Group 186 —0.10 0.92 4.43 4.95
Closed LDCs
Babrain 80 4.37 1.52 7.27 8.51 16.18
Greece 800.83 1.67 9.99 10.01 18.77
Me>:ico 430.03 3.59 15.23 15.23 22.09
Portugal 59 4.94 2.13 11.72 12.74 21.56
South Africa 62 —3.92 1.91 11.38 11.99 14.75
Group 284 1.29 1.37 11.05 11.60
ClosedEuropeanlICs
Oustria 82—2.25 0.89 3.94 4.55 7.69
Belqiue 630.42 0.89 2.15 2.98 5.05
Denmark 610.14 1.01 4.83 4.63 7.1.3
France 6 1.35 0.54 2.50 2.05 4.82
tra1nd 5Q2.14 1.40 8.4! 6.'?a 12.25
Italy 81 1.42 0.72 3.15 3.46 5.52
Ncireay 641.07 0.75 3.25 3.43 5.5'l
Spain 833.12 1.26 5.53 8.261i.8
Sneden 830.04 1.07 4.57 4.57 8.29
Grr.ip 5800.93 0.67 4.23 4.54
Lib2r31izinq Pciiic DOn0 1CC 0-21' i.06 4.52 7.85
pan 83 —0.69 0.64
•2.48 3.55 4.33
F!aLjaland :-li82 1.99 7.16 8.48 14.11
uroup 1831.32 0.79 5.48 5.114
All Countrint 1)5280.49 6.114.i0Table 7a: PROJECTION OF REAL FORWARD DISCOUNT
(to find ex ante differential and its standard deviation)
COUN(RY
Cceffi:iis Prlect4dPust?
ci Fc:njaid1tlrEct kiflltlDnChi3tacdard P.
CbCurst;ritLi5curt Differenti3iferenti V1u DE;i;tiD Squared
040404 63 0.17 3.52 -0.17 -0.26 2.40 0.55-0.06
8EFIIIAHY 43 2.07 2.71 -1.70 —0.27 11.33 * 1.68 0.25
02 3.79 2.92 1.33 —0.04 26,53 2.64 7.Oo
SIOTZEFL 62 3.00 3.37 -2.79 0.35 17.01 2.25 0.36
001760 K 63 1.03 9.12 *—7.21 I0.83 12.20 t2.07 0,24
0004 0014 62 —1.11 -'0,43 1.74 —0.53 7.22l.6 0.01
74L41814 02 1.30 4.5! 0.04 -0.09 18.21 * 3.21 0.62
211180004 11 2.57 1.24 0,fl 0.42 1.10 0.44-0.10
0400410 60 -2,22 1.0 -1.37 -0.74 4.01 2.52 0.02
890602 56 -1.5S 0.60 —0.12 0.62 10.04 4.41 0.09
350100 A3—15.02 0.21 0.05 0.06 0.77 2.02. —0.10
000T044L 59-T.R2 0.75 1.45 1—1.06 121.51 6.83 0.34
300(9 OFl 1.25 1.00. —0.61 -0,7 1 520.27 10.75 0.23
AUS1RIO 620,7 1.30 —0.04 —0.25 6.91 1.76 0.10
02U177 oa 1.42 1.72 -1.35.!!3 I20.22 11.9 0.35
05110030 61 —1.07 0.72 0.42 0.46 11.61 2.51 0.19
FF4006 64 0.62 7.2 1.20 0.72 1 22.37 1 1.c73.9
136144W 59 3,4411.12k-0.68'—1.41 * 277.71 *5.730.3
HOLY r! —0.24 0.14 0.85 —0.64 7.79 ' 1.60 0.16
50 —0.25 —1.31 1.60 0.31 2.74 0.87-0.04
SF4111 63 —3.05 0.30 0.93 t--0.23 19.54 3.65 0.36
SF6029 4 -4.22-1.1 3,5 -0.14 15.71k 2.77 0.20
41J:3104LJ '0-1.14 0.72 —0.32 0.1212.80' 2.27 0.23
63 2.26 u,61 -3.87 0.26 2.26 *1.48 0.07
364 2260 60-5.66 1.52 -1.54 0.74 22.02 5:6 0.32
* Statistically-significant at 95% level
(using Hansen-Hodrick standard errors)Table St RETURNTOFORWARD EXCHANGE SPECULATION
Forward Discount LessRealized Exchange Depreciation









Canada 651.04 2.03 9.15 9.21 16.95
Germany Ob4.11 5.92 25.85 26.18 44.23
Netherlands 654.35 6.09 26.32 26.68 44.91
Switzerland 65 3.98 6.22 21.74 28.02 46.77
United Kingdom 653.77 6.21 27.72 27.96 42.95




Wing Kong 65-3.79 222 10.76 11.41 24.43
Malaysia 65—0.74 2.31 10.31 10.34 18.92
Singapore 65—0.35 2.01 9.64 9.65 19.07
Group 195 1.62 1.71 10.19 10.44
Closed LDCs
fli-ecce 653.64 5.32 25.84 26.10 46.22
Mexico 436.04 12.29 50.74 51.10 89.44
Portugal 8211.27 5.07 22.53 25.23 41.80
Saudi 4ratia 65—1.49
¶ 0.52 2.82 3.19 5.55
South Africa 65-4.83 9. t9 42.50 2.77 83.90
G:uup 2992.59 3.03 3i.59 32.21
Cl ospd Europsan DC
iustria 635.38 6.00 26.27 28.82 46.00
Beiqium 857.51 5.4u 23.77 24.94 44.75
Denmark 657.5 5.51 2*.27 25.42 43.91
Francr- 6137.47 5.5424.23 53.3742.92
Ireland 637.27 3.75 24.67 25.73 45.05
Italy 652.77 5.3323.2024.92 40.91
Norway 657.20 0.73 21.10 22.31 38.55
Spain 652.98 5.00 22.28 24.055.C8
Suerlen 436.20 4.47 20.21 21.1539.05
rcuo 817.37 5.82 23.22 24.39
Liberalizing PacificDOs
Australia 65 1.09 6.55 32.41 32.43 61.46
Japan 6510.98 5.57 25.12 27.45 53.50
Few Zealand 58.81 8.42 36.98 38.03 73.92
Group 1958.96 5.59 31.72 32.75
All Countries 15954.53 25.25 26.01Table 8a PROJECTION OF RETURN TO FORWARD EXCHANGE SPECULATION
(to find ex ante exchange risk premium and its standard deviation)
220130
Cuefflct
3 Frw;rd:t-n irfIlr'ii CII 3taFdarJ 0
00+ CIrEtaut2!scDLrncDiff+rn;i0iff€renti "1Lt leviatira S'7uFie0
2811066 65-5.7 F12.14 -7.52 0.51 13.28 LOS 3.2
SERK800 65 a733 t—11.17 52.16 —3.79 20.03 I16.49 3.32
NEIHEELA :5.5.5 •24.52-12.2 2.73 31.16 I13.35 1.41
SOITIELL5 9.75F5.21 4.24 4,40 :6.43 16.4, 0.24
511751 0 65-I 1.11 24.47 —16.25 -1.63 30.62 '19.10o.s
0308030 65 2.41 1.04 0.12 -1.03 0.30 3.95 0.61
94081316 03-1.531.25-0.37 3,232.6 3.59 —3.03
31368090 :4 .40 2.2 +.T? 3.03 4.02 3.220,5I
2403.610 3-1.3 0.00 3.15 4,33 3.23 3.03—5.3
EFEECE 53—52.10* L,j3 3.73+ 0.27 18.62 15.17 0.54
1121136 3 —I22..0 —0.02 L37 2.34 I 9.70 27.5 0,20
009]166L 59—2.4 0.:5 *,53 -2.39' 26.00*14.57 2,35
SOOTh 02 04 -47.30 3.13 —1.37 .26 3.22 1339-0.0:
61:51316 -33 15.77 £:51 5.32 3.2 20.R 11.51 0.31
BELGIU1I 5 0.35 1-2. :5 -4.01 —4.60 ' 7.64 11.39 0.13
O333A1 04 32.31 *—1.15 3.40 F—3.33 12.33 '13.42 6.21
FF6856 15 11.51 —3.6] 6.59 —4.04 3.55 3.65 3.00
IOEL6IID 03 3.41 0,7 2.34 —q.5l F10.19F13.42 0.1
ItALY 64 —0.67 3.15 2.19 -5.03 F10.57F12.15 0.17
NUikAl 53 —1234 —2.55 :0.36 —1.63 1,53 21.15 0.16
30610 655733 --i.2 .33 —3.12 I 6.31 10.13 0:0
SALDEN 45 —1*71 F—13.11F33.10 -0.82 10,71 F13.29 5,46
433TtAL1 :3 -53,5'?:—1.33 1.61 4.13 533 13,53 3,35
38063 35 35.33 F—3.02F—37.11 2.13 12.90 F12.39 'LIF
NEW ZEAL 3 —27.50 *—1.15 3.3 3.40 11.31 F21.50 0.23
*Statisticallysignificant at 95% level
(using Hansen-Hodrick standard errors)Table 9; REAL dEPRECiATION OF CURRENCY
Realized Exchange Depreciation Lusa Realized Inflation Oifferential
September, 1992 to J.xnuary, 19118
1. 2 3 4
Series Root Men
# of Standard Standard Squared
Cbs. Mean Error Deviation Error 957. Sand
Open Atlantic DCs
Canada 63 —0.27 1.81 8.45 8.46 15.17
Germany 63-6.35 5.75 25.10 25.90 44.21
Netherlands 62 —5.11 5.90 25.14 25.88 43.78
Switzerland 62 -8.35 6.11 26.78 38.07 45.67
unitedlcingdom 63 —2.84 6.06 27.29 17.44 47.88
Group 313 —4.77 3.24 23.48 24.13
Liberalizing Pacific LEGs
Hong Knng 620.62 2.23 10.51 10.63 22.57
Malaysia 622.44 2.46 10.60 10.88 19.74
Sin;apore 620.43 2.39 10.86 10.88 19.23
Group 186 1.23 2.11 10.53 10.74
Closed LDCa
Bahrain 605.92 1.62 7.94 9.94 21.24
Greece 60 1.92 4.99 25.08 25.15 46.41
Mexico 62—3.32 9.31 47.96 48.07 89.57
Portugal 57 —3.12 4.73 22.6324.0646.25
SouthAfrica 620.27 10.74 47.16 47.18 78.62
Group 301 —1.46 4.27 33.93 34.24
C1cadEuropean DEs
Austria 64 —7.30 5.54 25.15 26.21 £i4.92
8elgium 637.67 5.09 22.61 23.90 44.90
Denmark 61 —7.94 5.60 24.05 25.35 41.85
France 64 —6.36 5.39 24.05 24.9742.24
Ireland 615.85 5.56 24.12 24.84 43.47
Italy 61 —8.01 5.44 23.2424.6041.38
Noruai 64 —5.92 4.64 21.05 21.89 37.90
Spain 63 -6.01 5.2522.6723.47 39.51
Sweden 63 -6.23 3.95 18.35 19.41 33.17
Grcup 5646.79 5.7622.7323.74
Liberalizing Pacific DEc
Australia 602.38 4.78 33.00 33.0970.90
Japan 63 —12.12 5.43 25.3028.1052.98
Nleuealand 004.77 8.49 37 00 37.31 B2.32
Group 1334.94 5.6331.8632.79
1547 —4.16 25.61 26.28
All CotLntrietTable 9a: PROJECTION OF REAL tURRENCY DEPRECIATION
(to find ex ante real depreciation and its standard deviatidn)
COUNTRY
Cuetcentu rrujated0djuuted
o of crjard interEst InflatIon 061 Standerd 0
OhsConatanODisruntDiffer'tifferefltiOaiIeCensatiurSquared
CNA0 o3 .S0 + -10.12 535 -1.23 24.43 r 5.36 0.32
2E6114N3 :3 -43.9 14.29 27,77 4.07 16.10 115.06 6.27
01142010 02-23.03 *-21.32 11.17 -1.42 19.25 +15.91 0.32
SWI1E4L .,2—45.a3 1.54—!0,72 -2.47 11.33 14.39 0.19
UNITEDK 63ii3 -13.47 5.02 1.2! 22,66 f13.33 0.33
00140 FUN 62 —4.67 —0.9 393 1.43 2.63 3.02 —2.05
110L09514 02 3.12 -2.43 039 -0.06 3.12 0.66-0.14
SI96000R 211.5& —o.25 .21 3.55 4.+ .'0O 0.02
3000010' -i .°4 —a.11 -0.23 3.51 2.60 0.02
GREECE 56 OO.19 i.44 —7.76 -0.73l.2Bi4.0 '3.20
011103 3 136.43 1.03 —1.23 -2.23 4 1.Th 27.76 0.16
P0040306 57 —3.03 0.l't -3.00 1.33 f7.66 •10.59 0.12
4 SI354 0.21 0.39-.n2:2 19.26 3.07
;usloio 62-34.72 '—5.54 —5.41 3.43 15.c3 15.05 0.26
2E12160 6313.23-7,73 3.94 4.47 4'.01 10.22 3.60
11119000 sI 35.34 -7.01 5.791.56 14.16 0.26
FWCC 64-:1.74 f.09 £05 +,31 3.42 3.33 —0.00
1OEL4IID 59-15.12 0.37 -1.5? 3.77 5.? 10.96 •3.1o
11061 1 2.13 -3.46 —6.02 .77 13.02 11.35 0.14
qUOPoi 5611.7 1.24 —3.46 1.94 O.k 1 13.750.
300111 63373 3.53 -0.06 4.63 2.70 11.25O.k
362020 0310.30 11.0? 410.0i 0.76 26.36 11.34 0,30
42510011 5024.95 +2.20 3.37 -4.11 5.46 13.07 434
30040 s3—31.37—r.22 30.14 —6.47 10.10 + 1.95 0.14
NoO 3EL sO22.25 4.5 -3.73 2.34 9.54 *19,44 .3.17
* Statisticallysignificant at 95% level

























































































































































1985 1987Ooltr (4), the size of the bard wide eru4 to ercaçass
95 per cent of deviations fran international coveral interest
parity, can be cxiparal with the approach of Fren]ceJ. aid Levith
(1977). Theytested a larger bard ant to represent
transactions costs between pourdarddollar scities. They
fourd, for the case of the United that a smaller
percentage of deviations (87.6 -89.7percent, p.1217)fell
withinthe bard.This confinis that capital nthiity has
increasedsince the 19705.
Germany ard several other neigltorlrg European countries
[Switzerlard, the Netherlands, Austria, ard lgiwn] show
higher interest rates locally than offshore, which su]gests
saie barriers disocxingfrq capital inflow: investors would rct
settle for a lower mark return in the Euranar]cet if they were
free to get the higher return in Germany. ait the magnite is
quite all, as it has been observed to be ever since Genany
rezcn&itcst of its controls on capital inflow In 1974(Dooley
aidIsard, 1980; aM Giavazzi aid Pagano, 1985,p.27).
Japanhas a covérs5. differential that by all neasures is
snalle-r aM less variable than those ofSwitzerlardaM
Germany, let ala Frame aid izcst oftheother cx,untries.
This night as a surprise to those accstc to thinkirq
ofJapanesefinancial markets intena of thelarge barriers to
capital inflow that were inplace in the1970s. The
liberalization ofJapanesemarkets, which has been doanented
elsewhere, continued during our sample period.29 Australia
28aM New Zealard, while lagfrq well behird Japan, shcw signs of
liberalization durixg the carse of air saEple period.30
The covered interest differential for France is nnflt
larger aid tinre variable than that for the other major
irdustrializal countries knan to be free of capital controls.
This is the reverse of the finlin fran the criterion of real
interest differentials in Table 5. It supports the value of
the criterion of covered interest differentials as the prcper
test of financial market interatic.ti. The differential, with
its neqative sign signifying rtrols on French capital
aitflQs, has been previously studied, especially its terilercy
to shoot up shortly before devaluations of the franc.31
data indicate that the last major ocairrerce of this çberaint
was February 1986; since then the differential has been close
to zero.
similarly, the sane phenomenon for Italy, which has also
been previously studied (e.g., Giavazzi aid Pagano, 1985),
appears to have enial after the February 1986 realigreent.
France aid Italy have apparently been dismantlirq their capital
contxols qpickly ein4i to neet a 1990 aaaillIrefor
liberalization recently set by the EEC Twelve.32Of four
cairrtries that are expected to require a later dad1 iris, Spain
aid Porttqal have by our measures already been liberalizing
[plots sln'z that the magnitude of the covered interest
differential fell shaiply in 1987 for these two countries], bit
Greece and IreJ.aM have not. Sweden is one ic-EEC European
29cazttry that appears to have rial tauaid liberalization
durfrg air sarple period, while Norway does not. AU of these
European aazntries show up with reative maan differentials,
whith inplies that the rainixq controls act to discourage
capital aitflow rather than inflow.For the C cxxintries,
this firxlirg supports records of the European Canmission, which
report ncre fran for short—term inflows than short-term
outflows.
Registerirq inipressively open finarcial markets are air
three East Asian IDCs [tdi,especiallyin the case of
Singapore, have rapidly cntgram the appellation "less
develqped"].Hong Ilorq ard Singapore show analler cweral
differentials even than some open European countries like
Germany. Malaysia's differential has been considerably higher,
particularly in 1986, but still catpares favorably with sate
European countries.
Not surprisingly, our reniainirg LDCS [Mexico, Gr,
Portugal, Bahrain arc! Saith Africa] show by far the largest arc!
itst variable covered interest differentials.34Again, the
results are precisely what one n1ld expect if covered interest
differentials are the proper criterion for capital rbility,
hitthe reverse of what the saving-investment criterion shows.
Why does the covered differential criterion give such
different answers fran the savirg-thvesbnent criterion, which
shows a high degree of saving-retention ancrq irdustrialized
30crintries?Feldstein aM Horioka (1980, p.315) argusthat
financial marketsare less well integratedatlonger-term
maturities, as ccnrtparal to the three-ixinth maturities used in
tests of covered interest parity such as those reported above:
It is clear frau the yields at short-ten s&tirities in
the Euroairrency market aid the forward prices of those
curreities that liquid financial capital rves very
rapidly to arbitrage such short-term
differentials. .. .Thereare haQever reasons to be
sceptical about the extent of such long-ten arbitrage.
Studies of international Interest parity have been
restricted by a lack of forward exctharqe rates at horizons
going exit nuch further than one year.35 kit even without the
use of forward rate data, there are ways of getting araird the
problem of exchange risk.tata on cirrercy swap rates can be
used in place of forward exchange rates to test the long—term
version of Interest rate parity. Pcwer (1987) firds that the
swap-covered return differential on 5-year U.S. goverruient
bords versus Japanese bctds averaged only 1.7 basis points frau
October3,1985toJU].y 10, 1986, aid that the differential on
7-yearbords averaged only 5.3basispoints. The maans mask
sane variation in the differential. Bit a bard of46 basis
points islargeenoisgh to encaupass 95percent ofthe
observations for the 5—year bonds. The bard is 34basispoints
31for the 7—year bons. The neans an 5-year horde for sai other
major countries are as foUzs: Canada 15.9, Switzerland 18.7,
united Kirqdcn 51.1, aM Germany 28.4.
The magnit4s of these laq-term differentials cntçare
favorably with the magnitude of the short-ten differentials.
The implication is that Feldstein and Horioka are wrrg in
their conjture that there is a ten-stricture weeqe
separatir national capital nkats.36 me nrist relevant
distirction appears to be, not lorg-term vs. short-term, hit
rather real vs. rntlnal.
4.3 "Peal forward discounts:" The anremv vraniuxn
Even for those countries that ethibit no substantial
country premium, as reflect& in covered interest parity [fd-
(i -i*)=0],there naystillbe a substantial ourrercy
prEniuzn that drives real interest differentials [(i -expinf 1)
-(i*-expirtfl*)]away fran zero.If real interest
differentials axe not arbitraged to zero, then there is in turn
no reason to eçect savirq—investnent correlations to be zero.
Table 7 reports the statistics for the airrercy prsthn,
as measured by the "real forward discount:"
fd -(expinfl -expinfl*).
Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Austria and Japan, for
example, all have substantial real forward discounts (or—
ucre precisely —realforward premia), which constitute
32approximately the entirety of their real interest
differentials. These are ns*ries with currencies that have
exrietd a 1t of exchange rate variability, both 'uninal
az real, vis-a-vis the dollar slice 1973, alt especially since
1980.As a consequence, sate canbination of exchange risk
premiuns ard expectal real depreciation —factorspertainir4
to the currency, not to the political jurisdiction —produces
the gap in real interest rates.For these five financially
open iniustrializ&1. octmtries, ard for Borg Thn as well, the
currency factors produce a negative real interest
differential, while the covered interest differential (tha.4i
small) is pceitive: the ttal1 regulations or frictias that
renain in these caintries are, if anything, working to resist
capital inflow (at least at the short eM of the maturity
spectnmt), not aitflaz as one waild mistakenly carlude fran
the real interest differential criterion. The other countries
all have highly variable currency premiums as well •IMeedthe
real_al forward discount (currency preniint) is iitre variable than
the covered interest differential (cc*mtxy premium) for all bit
three of air 25 cazitries (Greece, Mexico, aM Frame). The
last rows of Tables 6 aM 7 show that the average variability
across all caintries is higher for the currency premium than
for the octintry premium.
Table 7a projects the real forward discount on the s
three variables as in Table Ba to get an ex ante measure. Its
stardarfi deviation iz shows six ca.intries for what the
33crrezxy preini'tnt is less variable than the ccxwrtrypre3ni
(Greece, Mexico, Portual, Ftarca, Italyaid Spain). 3± the
oarrery preiniini reiains the majorobstacle to real. interest
parity for ret countries.
4.4 Further decarositiOn into excbarcte risk preniinaid
e3cDectaI real deeciati
our deccattpositiat so far has 1inip two tens, the
excharie risk premium aid expect& real depreciation, together
into the currerty premium:
fd -expIntl. + exp infl* =(fd-expdepr) + (e)q) depr-
exp intl + exp infl*).
In this section we attempt to ccxplete the decanpositict k&
separatirg these two tens. TO do so requires a sure or
ncdel of expected depreciation. Theus'iialaporoach is to use
the a post charges In the spot rate (depr) as a measure of ex
ante expectations (eq depr), aid to argue that urder rational
expectations the eçectational error (edepr -expdepr)
shaild be rardan (urorrelated with intonation currently
available at tl t).
Column (1) of Table 8 reports the iiean value of (fd-
depr) for each of am countries.)tst of the means are
positive, showini that the weak-dollar period (1985-88)
dominates over the strorg-dollar period (1982—1985). [The five
exceptions, currercies that depreciat against the dollar at a
34rate ncre rapid than predict by the forward discount, v.re
the Hag Hag dollar, DJ.aysian rirwit,sirgaporedollar,
Saudi Arabian riyal, ard Saith African r&d.] Sit only three
currencies have n risk preniims, of either sign, that are
statisticafly significant[theSaixii Arabian riya.1., ard two
that awreciated strorqly against the dollar, relative tothe
forward rate: theJaparseyen ard the Portuguese esct.do].
Furtherre, in a majority of cases [16/25], the sign of the
nean return differential is the rcsite of the signofthe
tan real interest differential during the sass period (Table
5, column 1).So this uasure of the exchange risk premium
does not explain any positive part of the real interest
differential.
The neasures of variability of (fd -depr)show up very
large in altmins (2), (3) aid (4). These are neasures of the
variability of ex post return differentials, not ex ante. They
tell us little abazt the variability of the exoharge risk
premium. Sit the high variability of the exztharge rate does
tell us two things. First, it provides an thvious explanation
—lowpower —whythe first nntnts might not be
statistically significant. On the other hard, the existerce of
substantial wcertainty regardirg the futhre spot rate
suggests, via the theory of optimal portfolio diversification,
that a non-zero exchange risk premium nist exist, to reward
risk-averse investors for holding currencies that are perceivs
as risky or that are In oversupply.
35To estimate the ex ante excbarge risk preniwn,in TableBa
we project (fd -depr)onto air s three variables: the
forward discount,interest differentia]. axt inflation
di.fferent.ia1.. The rsressiai is statisticafly siüficant for
a majority of currencies, as manyothers have fccrd.37The
stan3ard deviation shais the ntst variable eiethargerisk
prEd.uns belorg to Mexico aid New Zealard,bit the United
Kflan,Netherlards,Austria, Germany aid Switzerlard follow
close behird.
In Table 9 we report the statistics for theother
ccrçonent of the currency premium, expected realdepreciation.
As natal earlier, given the widely-acceptedfailure of
purthasirq power parity on levels, thereis na theoretical
reason to expect it necessarily to boldin tens of expected
rates of thaxwe, the hypothesis scuietlsiss )an&n as exante
relative purdhasirg power parity.Table 9 reports the
statistics for ex post real depreciation. The neans in colnt
(1) are negative, irdicatirq real açreciaticnof the currency
against the dollar, for all Europeancountries aid for ncst
others as well.The only five eceptions, countries that
experieit real depreciation against the dollar, wereour
three East Asian developing countries, Australia, aidBabrain.
This last was the only one, of either sign,that was
statistically significant.
We already kxi, frau the results reported abovefor the
36119 years of U.S.-U.K. data, that we canrct expect to reject a
ante relative PPP on just a fe', years of data:ri
disturbances to the real exchange rate are so large, that ae
needs a nuich laqer tine saiiple to f lid evidezte of systanatic
nwenent. Sat the signs of the n real depreciations are
usually the sane as the signs of the nean realinterest
differentials in Table 5 (20/25], suggestiN a high correlation
of the real interest differential aM expected real.
depreciation across countries. (Coliums (2)—(4) shcw very high
variability in real depreciation, but again this tells us
little about the variation of a ante expected depreciation,
beyord the &servation that the high level ofvariability
iiçl lee laz per in ar tests of a anterelative purcthasirq
pcMer parity.]
To estimate a ante expected real depreciation, in Table
9a we project a post real depreciation, again, on the sane
three conten!poraneals variables. The staMard deviationsfor
the varicis currencies are qpite similar to those reportedin
Table Sa for the projected exchange risk prnium.(It seaM
that in both cases an aarently predictable canponentof the
spot rate charqes constitutes niost of thevariation (as opposel
to variation in the forward disccAint or inflation differential,
respectively):the significant coefficients on the forward
disccunt,interest differential aM a post inflation
differential in Table 9a are always of opposite signaM
37sinilar maqnite as those inTable8a]. In st cases [18/253
the projectel echange risk premittu is slicitly re variable
than projected real depreciation.
5. Conclusion
We can ann up with four conclusions.
(1) Capital controls ard other barriers to the ncveisnt of
capita]. across national borders remained for such countries as
the United ICinjdnn aM Japan as recently as 1979, aM flai
aM Italy as recently as 1986. &± a contiraiing worldwide
trerd of intsration of financial itarkets in the 1980s had all
but eliminated interest differentials for major irdustrialized
coi.ntrjes by 1988.
(2) Only the country preuii.nn has been eliminated; this neaz
that only covered interest differentials are snail.
Real aid nominal exthane rate variability remain, aid irdeed
were larger in the 1980s than in the 197Os, The result is
that a crresv prenitin remains, consjstir of an exchange risk
premitnn plus expected real currency depreciation. This nEans
that, even with the alization of covered interest rates,
large differentials in interestrates remain.
(3) The United States in the l980s began to borni on such a
38massive sate internationally that the traditional "Feldstein-
Horioka" firxiin of a near-unit correlation between national
savirq aId invesbnent has broken dn.The process of
liberalization in Japan aid other major caintries was prcbably
one factor behird this massive flai of capital to the United
States.
(4)Inaddition to the gape that distinguish covered interest
parity fran real interest parity, there is a further gap that
separates real interest parity fran the proposition that
changes in national saving do not crowd at Investment because
they are raa&13 y financed by borrowini fran abroad. Bads are
not perfect substitutes for &juities, aid euities are not
perfect substitutes for plant aid eguiprt. Thus at eadi
stage, there are good reasons to think that shortfalls in
national saving continue to be capable of cras'dln ait
investment, even iftoa smaller extent than before 1980.
References
Adler, Michael aid Bruce Lehman, 1983, "Deviations fran
Purchasln PaPIer Parity In the Long Itin," Jairnal of Finance
39,5, 1471—1478.
Argy,Victor, 1987,"InternationalFinancial Liberalisation—
39The Aust.raliart ani Japanese cperierces Catar&L" Bank of
Japan Monetary ani Econanic Studies 5,1,105—168.
Boothe, P., K. Clinton, A. Cote, ait D. thngrth, 1985,
"International Asset substitutability: Theory ani Evidence for
canada," Ottawa, Bank of Canada.
caprio, C. ani D. Howard, 1984, "Dcinestic Savirq, Current
Accounts, ani international Capital )i1ity,"International
Finance Discussion Papers no •244, (Washinton,D.C.,Federal
Resene Board).
Carairiazza, F., K. Clinton, A. Qte, aM D. Lorqworth, 1986,
"International Capital Mobility aM Asset Substitutability:
Sate Theory aM Evidence on Recent Structural Ctiares," Bank of
Canada, Tec±nical Report 44.
Cardia,Emanuela, 1988, "Crociixq cut in Open Ecornuies,"
Cahier 8823, TJnlversite de Montreal, June.
Claassen, Emil aM Ciarles Wyplcsz, 1982,"CapitalControls:
Sane Principles aM the French cperience," Annales de 1' fl4S
47—48,237—267.
Cumby,R. aM F. Mishkin, 1986, "The International Linkage of
40Real Interest Rates: The Eurcçiean—tJ. S. Connection," Jainl of
International Wney anl FinarK* 5, 5-24.
Cuinby, R. ax H. Cbstfeld, 1984, "InternationalInterest Pate
aid Price Level Tinkeges urder Flexible Exchange Rates: A
Review of Peoent Evidence," in:J. Bilsat ai R. Marston,
eds., Exchame Rate Theory ard Practice, thicago: University
of Chicago Press.
-
Derby,Michael, 1981, "IXes Purchasirq Power Parity Worki"
Proceedirus of the Fifth West Coast Pradnic/F&enl Reserve
Ecaunic Researth Sitinar, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco.
Derby, Michael, 1986, "The internationalization ofAllErican
Barikirq aM Finance:Stricture, Risk aM World Interest
Rates," Journal of International rtrev ait Finarce 5, 4, 403-
428.
znireuez, Kathryn, 1986, "ExpectationsFornatian in the
Foreign Exchange Market: New Evidence nun Survey Data,"
nic Letters.
Dooley, Michael, Jeffrey Frankel, aM Donald Mathieson,1987,
"International Capital Mobility: What Do Saving-Investment
Correlations Tell Us?" International Monetary Ftut Staff
41Pairs, 34, no.], 503—530.
Dooley, .M. alt P. Isard, 1980, "Capital Controls, Political
Risk alt Deviations from Interest-Pate Parity," Jawnal of
Political Ecornw 88,2, 370—384.
Dornbusch,Rildiger, 1983,"Pea]. Interest Pates, Home Goods alt
OptimalExternal Borrowirg," Jaa'nal of PoliticalEcornay,
February.
&gel, diaries, alt Fanneth KLetzer, 1987, "Saving alt
Investent in an C4en Economy with Non-'Itadsl Goods," Nfl
Working Paper no. 2141, February.International Economic
forthcoming.
Feldstein, H., 1983, "Domestic Saving alt International Capital
Movements in the Lag m alt the Short Rim, European Economic
Review 21, 139—151.
Feldstein, Martin, ed., 1987, The Effects of 'rantion on
Canital Accuimlation, Ciicago: University of Qiicago Press.
Feldstein, H. alt P. Bacthetta, 1989, "National Savings alt
International Investhnt," NEER Conferez on Saving [this
volume].
42FeJ.dstein, M. aid C. Horioks, 1980, "Dnstic Saving aid
International pital Flaas," Eooitric Jairnal 90, 314-329.
Fiele]ce, Norman, 1982, '!National Saving aid Intexnatinl
Investhent,"in: Savirn aid GcvernisntPolicy,O3nfererce
Series nc. 25, F&eral Reserve Bank of Boston.
Franks]., Jeffrey, 1982, "On the Franc," Anna.les de l'INSEE, 47—
48,185—221.
Frankel, Jeffrey,1984,"The Yen/Dollar Agreement:
Ltheralizirg Japanese Capita]. Markets," Policy Analyses in
International Econanics nc. 9,Washlnjton,D.C.: Institute for
International EcDncauics.
Frankel, Jeffrey, 1986,"InternationalCapital Mthility aid
Crowdirg-ait in the U.S.Econaxty:Diperfect Intntion of
Financial Markets or of Goods Markets?" In R. Hafer, a,
Open is the U.S.Eoqncatty?,Lexinjton, Ma.: Lexington Books, 33-
67.
Franks].,Jeffrey,1988a, "InternationalCapitalF1said
DnsticFwaicPolicies."In M. Feldstein,ed., s United
statesin the WorldEoonox, University ofCiticago Press:
thicago.
43Frankel, Jeffrey,1988b, "International.Cpita1Mobilityaz
Ebccharqe Rate Variability," International Payments litalarces,
Bald Peak, N. H., Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (forthnirq).
Frankel, Jeffrey art Kenneth Froot, 1987, "tsin Survey Data to
Test Standard PropositionsRegarding ExchangeRate
Expectations," Aiterican Econanic Review 77, 1 (March 1987).
Frankel, Jeffrey art Kenneth Froot,1988,"thartists,
Furdanentalists art the Deani for 1lars," Forthcxnirg in
Policy' Issues for Interdeperdent Eoornnies, edited by
A.Courakisart M.Taylor,Lordon,1988.
Ftankel, Jeffrey, art Alan MacArthur, 1988,"Politicalvs.
Currercy Prenia in International Real Interest Differentials: A
Study ofForward Rates for 24 Camtries,"European Eanric
Review, 32.
Frenkel, Jacob, 1981, "Flexible Dcchanqe Rates, Prices art the
Role of 'News': Lessons fran the l970s," Joirral of Political.
Econaw 89, ic. 4, 665—705.
Ftenkel, J. aid R. Levich, 1977, "Transaction Costs art
Interest Arbitrage:Tranquil versus Turbilent Periods,"
Jairnal of Political Economy' 85, 6, 1209—1226.
44Ytoot, Kenneth ani Jeffrey Etankel, 1989,"Forward Disciit
Bias:Is It An Excbane Risk Premium?" QuarterlyJairnal of
EconcEtlics.
thosh, Atish B., 1988, "Hat Mobile is Capital? S Simple
Tests," Harvard University, Mactether.
Giavazzi, Francesco aid Marco Pagano, 1985, "Capital ntrols
aid the European Monetary Systet," inCanita]. Controls ai
Foreian Excharcre Leqislation, Occasional Paper, Milarto:
Euroirbiiare.
(flick, Reuven, 1987, "Interest Rate Linkages in the Pacific
Basin," Ecantiic Review No. 3, pp.31-42.
Gou.tder, Larry aid Barry Eicherqreen, 1988, "Savingsa*gtion,
investnent Pranation, az International Canpetitiveress," NR
Working Paper No. 2635, June.
Harberger, Arnold C., 1980, "Vignettes on the World Capital
Market," Anerican Economic Review, Vol. 70, 331—337.
Hatsopoulos, Grge, Paul Krugman, aM Larry Sminers, 1988,
"U.S. orpetitivermss: Beyord the Trade tficit," Sciez, vol.
24(July15),299—307.
45Huizisa, Jthn, 1987, "An Empirical Investigation of the L0r9
Thin Behavior of Real Exchange Rates" Caxneie—Withester
Conference Series.
lcoraczyk, Ttbert, 1985, "The Pricing of Forward Contracts for
Foreign Thccharqe," Journal of Political Ekorxrtv 93, 2, 346—368.
Krugman, Paul, 1978, "Purchasix Power Parity aid Exchange
Pates: Another teak at the Evidence," Journal of International
Eccnc*riics 8, no. 3, 397—407.
Mark, Nelson, 1985, "Sane Evidence on the International
Inepality of Real Interest Bates," Journal of International
Money aid Finance 4, 189—208.
MacArthur,Alan,1988,"International Financial Market
Integration: Empirical Analysis with Data fran Forward an
flitures Currency Markets," ft. D. thesis,Universityof
California, Berkeley.
Mishkin, Fte%ric, 1984a, "Are Peal Interest Rates Equal Across
Countries? An Empirical Investigation of International Parity
Corditions," Journal of Finance 39, 1345—1358.
Mishkin, Freric, 1984h, "The Real Interst Pate: A Multi-
country Empirical Study, Canadian Journal of Ecx,ncxriics 17, no.
462, 283—311.
Morgan Guaranty Thist Carpariy, 1988, "Financial Markets in
Europe: TaQard 1992," World FinarciaJ. Markets 5, Sept. 9, 1—15.
tDe.rt, 1984, "Capital &tilityaithe Relationship.
between savirq aM Investhent in 0E O3untries," Jrna1 of
International bflney aid Finan 3, 327-342.
Obstfeld, Maurice, 198 Ga, "Capital Nobility in the World
Economy:Theory and Measurement," Cariie-Ptester
iferezxe Series on Public Policy, 31, 1-24.
Cbstfeld, Maurice, 198Gb, "How Intsrated are World Capital
Markets?Sate New Tests," Nfl 1*Drkirq Paper No. 2075;
forthcoming in R. Firdlay et al., ads., DSt. Stabilization ai
[ve).r ESsays in Mezrrv of Car].os Diaz-AlejaiXiro. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
Otani, Ithiro, 1983, "Exchange Rate Instability aM capital
Controls: The Japanese Eerienc* 1978—81," in: D. Bigman aM
T. Thya, ads., Exchange Rate aM Trade Instability:causea11
Cons&uerCes aM Reies, Caitridge,:Ballizger.
Penati, A. aM M. Dooley, 1984, "Current Accairit Thibalarces aM
capital Fornation in Irdustrial Caintries, 1949-1981, DifStaff
47Pan 31, 1—24.
Pigott, C1iarles aid Rithard Sweeney, 1985. In cchare Pates,
made aid the U.S. Eor, sitteti by S. Andt, R. Sweeney aid
T. Wilett,Washington, D.C.: Airicanfl'iterprise Institute.
Popper, Helen, 1988, "long—term Owered Interest Parity: Tcc
Tests Using Currency Swaps,"University of Californja,
Berkeley.
11, Richard, 1979, "Violations of Purchasing Pazer Parity aid
their Implications for Efficient International Caincdity
Narkets," in M. Sarnat aid G. Szeo, ads., International
Finance aid made, vol. 1, Cmbridge, Mass.: Ballirger.
Paibini, Nariel, "Current Accrt aid $get Deficits in an
Interteiporal }tdel of Constuflion aid Tantion Sucothing: A
Solution to the 'Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle'?" Yale University,
Octther 1988.
Summers, L., 1988,"Tax Policy and International
Qx!petitiveness. HInJaccb Frenkel, el., International Asneots
of Fiscal Policies, NEER, thicago:University of thicago
Press.
Taylor, Nark, 1988, "Covered Interest Arbitrage aid Market
48mrbilence: An Thipirical. Analysis." Centre for Econric Policy
Research Disaissiai Paper No •236.
Ithin, Jane, 1983, "'stic Saving aid Iriternationa]. capital
Movements in the Long Thin aid the Short Rn,' by M. Feldsteln:
oznnt," aircçean Eccnnnic Review 21, 153-156.
westgtial, we, 1983,"Cxrwients on estic Saving aid
International Capita]. Movements in the Lcng ibm azxt the Short
Thin," Eurcrean Ecctic Review 21,157—139.
Wyplosz, tharles, 1986,"Capitalflais Liheralizaticrt aid the
E1: A French Perspective," fliSD Working Papers No. 86/40.
EuroneanEconomy, European Econanic Caninity, June 1988.
491. spitethe increased attention to Inward foreign direct
investiient in the United States in recent years, itcontinues
to be a atafler ccvponent ofthe capitalinfla than portfolio
investrsnt. As of the eM of 1987, foreigndirect investment
acortal for only 17per cent of the total stock offoreign-
held assets in the United States.
2.There were relatively large differentials separatln U.S.
interest rates fran the Eurodollar rates; at the long-term eM
of the spectra, well-]cnin U.S. corporations could borrw re
cheaply in the Euranarket than danesticafly. These
differentials fell steadily taiiard zero between 1982 aid 1986,
probably as the outccs of innovation that ocairred in the
Eurrziar]cets —partlyin response to these differentials—
making iteasierfor U.S. corporations to borrcw there.Much
of this innovation went urder the nane of seairitization. See
Frankel (1988) for documentation aid further references. [It
appears that the seoaritizationtreidsuf feral a set-back in
1987 aid 1988, in part associated with the October 1987 stock—
market crash; it is in.' said to be slightly costly for
U.S. corporations to issue boSs in the Euranarket than
dcriestically.It remains to be seen whether this reversal of
the trerd toward perfect integration is serious or lasting. J
3.AMeven ifthis relationship doesn't break down inthe
future ujijer pressure fran fears of international creditors
that U.S. Iniebtedness is beccrxnin excessive.
4.There is a fifth possible —yetncre narrowly defined—
criterion for the degree of integration of financial markets:
the size of transactions costs as neasured directly by the bid-
ask-spread in, for example, the foreign exchange market.
surprisingly, the covered interest differential does riot appear
to be statistically related to the bid-asic azt (!t&thr 1988).
5. Obstfeld(1986) aid Stmiiers (1988) argue that the saving-
invesmtentcorrelation may be due to the camn influence of
grcvth rates.
6. Obstfeld (1986) makes the large-cc*.intry point in a tine-
series context, where it prer1y belongs. alt even in a tine-
series regression for a single country si.th as tie Tihitel States,
one can correct for the 1arge-mtry problen by expressing
savin aid investient rates as deviations fran the rest-of-c'Rrld
rates of savin art investment, respectively. USer the null
hypothesis,an excqenais fall inthe U.S. saving rate may drive
up the world real interest rate art ac*d out investment, hit
there is no evident reason for the crcsdixq-axt to be reflected
50in U.S.investment to any greater extent than in rest-cf-the-
world investhent. In Franks]. (1986, 44—45), i rand that the
close corresçcrdenoe between 13.5. saving aid lnvestnent for
1970—1985 remains, even with this adjustment.
7 •thstfeld(1986a) finds that the coefficient fell after 1973,
intimeseries correlations for ucetof his caintries, bit
ctstfeld(198Gb)findsthat it hasrisen over time (1967-84 vs.
1956-66),with the United states slnñng the highest
correlation of any.
8.In a U.S. timeseries context, Frankel (1986)used two
instrwnental variables: the fraction of the pcpilation over 65
years of age aid the ratio of military experditure to IP. The
former is considered a determinant of private saving ard the
latter of p.iblicsaving, aid both have se claim to
exogeneity.In the context ofcross-sections of developing anl
irdustrializ&I ca]ntries, Dooley, Frankel aid Mathieson (1987)
usel the dependency ratio aid, again, the military expenditure
variable.
9 .Other studies that reject real interest parity for major
irdustrializel countries incline Mish1kin (l984a, 198th), Oaity
aid Ctstfeld (1984), Mark (1985), aid Cumby aid Mishkin (1986).
Glick (1987) examines real interest differentials for six
Pacific Basin countries vis—a-vis the United States.
10. The 10-year real Interest differential via-a-vie a weighted
average of 0—5 countries was abaxt 3 par cent in 1984, whether
expected inflation is measured by a distrihited lag, by 050
forecasts, or by IIU forecasts •In1980, by rtrast, the
differential was about —2 per cent. Frankel (1986, pp. 35—36).
11. Gross investhient was 16.0 per cent of G1P in 1980, whith
was itself considered a low ntnter (dam 0 •5%fran1971—80].
12. The instnmental variables used are the dependency ratio
(the s.nu of those older than 64 aid those yauqer than 21,
divided by the workln-age population inbetween),tth is a
determinant of private saving, and military experditure as a
share of 2P, whith is a determinant of the federal bs3get
deficit. A data appendix is available, for details on t1 aid
the other variables.
13. There are two other potential sources of differences fran
the results in Frankel (l986) the Camrroe Department released
revised national ants data for the entire period in 1986,
aid we i use the dependency ratio as the deixqraçhic
inStrumental variable in place of the ratio the cver-65 to the
cve.r—20 pcpflation.Sit the years 1985—87 are indeed the
source of the fall in the coefficient; when these three years
ftt the coefficient is over 1 (as when the 1980's are
51anitted in Table 3].
14. If the 1956—1987 sample is splitat1974, when the United
States •:ait Germany rencved capital controls, rather than at
1979, there is still a precipitous decline in the cyclically-
adjustel savirg—invesnt coefficient aver tima: fran .87
(statistically, no differercefran 1) to .31(borderlire
differerce fran0).[Table 3a.] (If the 1930—1987 sample is
split at 1958, when many Eurcpean countriesrestored aurrercy
convertibility,there is a stall inrease in the coefficient
over tfite: frau .83 (statistically different fran 1) to 1.14
(no differen fran 1). [Table 2a.]Bit this is no doubt
because the saving aid investment rates are not cyclically
adjusted for this period, (theseries is not available back
to 1930). Ctly when expressed on a cyclically-adjusted basis
is the U.S. national savirg rate of 1985-1987 cbvastatiiqly laz.]
15. Feldstein aid Bacohetta (1989) find a sflnilar drop in the
saving—investhent coefficient in the l980s, for a cross-section
of industrialized cxxintries (tha4 they do not use
instnmerrta]. variables, aid are thus liable to the eccnanet.ric
criticisns that others have raised concerning the endogeneity
of national saving).
16. Measuring barriers to integration by differences in rates
of return has the problem that a given degree of integration
can appear snaller or larger depexxlixq on the disturbances to
saving (or to other variables) airing the sample period in
question.For example, the greater degree of variability in
theU.S. real interest differential in the 19805, as canpared
tothe 19705 or1960s, could be attrtited to the greater
swingsin variables such as the structural budget deficit,
rather than to a later degree of capital nrbility.[In any case, the degree of variability in cctered interest
differentials is very low in the 1980s, as we will see belai.]
All we can say for sure is that if the barriers to integration
are essentially zerO (the degree of capital ixthiity is essentially perfect), then differentials in rates of return
should be essentially zero.
17. For example, Knqnan fani that the staniard deviation for
the real mark/dollar exchange rate during the German
hyperinf].ation, February 192 0—December 1923, was mudi larger
(20.8 percent) than during the l970s, even tha4i the serial
correlation was hi'ier (.765).
18. Osnby aid Ctstfeld (1984, p. 146) used a Q-statistic to test
for higher order serial correlation in ztonthly real ediarge rate
changes aid found none.However they also faith that
expected inflation differentials were unrelated to expected
exchange rate changes,rejecting the random walk
characterization of the real exchange rate. Euizin (1986) wasalso able to reject the rardcin walk in saie cases.
19. As already ittal, an AR coefficient of•7at a yearly basis
correspadsto an AR of.97 on a rthlybasis (.97 —.70).
Thusitnild take 564 naiths of data (2.932(1_.972)/(1_.97)2
563.7) to be able to reject the nullhypothesis of AR —1.This
is 47 years, very little gain in efficlscy a t test atyearly
data.Suners (1987) demonstrates the las paser of ranlan
walk tests.
20. As the sa3lple period covers a number of changes in
exctiange rate reglss, it wcnld be desirable to alias for shifts
in the coefficient (aid in the variarce of the disturbarce
term). Sit many of the proponents of a rardan walk in the real
exchange rate claim itaseviderce infavorof an "equilibrium"
hypothesis, wder which fluctuations in the real eathange rats
are causal only by real, as cçpceel tontnetary,factors.
Urder this null hypothesis, changes in regiEs shaild not
matter for the real exchange rate. Thus aw statistical test
is a valid rejection of the null hypothis, even tbaxjh it
lumps tcqether all 118 years of cbservatiais.
21. sticky goods prices are only an of a n.nber of possible
sairces of dscriaticns fran ex ante relative PPP. Amther is
the exist.erce of the prices of nontradal goods in the relevant
price irdex.IX,rnbisch (1983) shas has ncvnt in the
relative price of rcin—traded goods affects the real interest
rate, savin, aid borrowing fran abroad, while Thigel art
lQetzer (1987)showspecifically has such nc'venent can give
rise totheFeldstein-Horioke finding.
22. The rationally expected rate of real depreciation estinted
fran a sific time series process is riot necessarily the s
as the actual expectation of real depreciation held by
investors. Frankel (1986,p. 58—59)used survey data at
expectationsofexchange ratechanges(collected by the
Ecatrist—affilliatedFinancial Bort) art forecasts ofprice
level changes (by )toocmpatea direct asure ofexpected
realdepreciation for the dollar against fivecurrencies.me
numberssIned an expectation that the real exchange rate terds
toregressback tatiard PPP ata statisticallysignificant rate
of 8 to12per cent a year. [The expected speed of raninal
depreciation back tasazd PFP is estimated more sharply at12-
16%ayearinFrankel artFroot (1987).Fora thora4t
rejection of the vies that investors' expected exchange rate
charges are zero, see Etoct art Frankel (1989).)
23.Sinulation models are also used by Qosh (1988), Gcnlder
aid Eichergreen (1988), art Ctstfeld (1986a) toaddressthe
Feldstein-Horioka findings.Obstfeld stns, in a life-cycle
model ofsavingwith actual OECD data on the furctional
distributictt ofirneaid on population growth, that the
53coefficient in an investhent reqression can be similar to tirise
estimated by Feldstein aid Horioka.ftzt Feldstein aid
Baatetta (1989) argue that the growth rate is rct In fact
responsible for the thserved coefficient.
24. saofthese data were also analyzed In Franksl &
MacArthur (1988).Scze forward rate ctiservaticris for Italy,
Austria, aid Belgium In the Barclay's data looked suspicious.
In aattion, Barclay's es mt qte a rate for Portugal. For
this sttziy, forward exthange rates for Italy aid Belgium are
taken fran the Bank of America (also obtained via WI), aid for
Austria aid Poit.al fran the Finartia]. Times. The Barclay's
data for Irelaid also appear suspect (1986—1988).
25 •'Thedata apperdix to Nfl Workini Paper 2309gives
details.
26 •Thestardard errors for irdividual country means are
usable, irdeed are conservative, despite the use of overlappirq
observations, because they are calailated as if there were T/3
observations rather than the actual P observations used.
27. Savirg—investnent regressions, by contrast, sin' the counterintuitive result: coefficients for W that are lower
(suggestirg higher capital wbility,InFeldsteln aid
Horioiica' s tei) than for irdustrializal countries. Fieleke
(1982), Dooley, Frankel aid Masson (1987) aid S.mnxers (1988).
28 •Itis possible that, for sn countries, seasonal variation
constitutes one forecastable ccriponent.
29. For example, Otani (1983) aid Frankel (1984).
30 •Thefrequently large negative covered differential that
bed been ctserved for Australia up to mid-1983 (see, e.g.,
Argy, 1987) largely vanished thereafter.
31. Clausen aid Wyplcsz (1982), Giavazzi aid Pagam (1985,
pp.27—28), [Ftar]cel (1982) aid Wyplosz (1986)], anarq others.
32. "Capita].Im," The Fjrraoist, May 21, 1988, p.95.
33. For Frai, Italy, Irelard, Spain aid Greece (as reported
in World Ftharcial Markets, September 9, 1988, p.5). Denmark's
covered differential retains quite high in our sairple.The
cxintxy has been reported to have r capital controls left
(EccmanJS, cc. cit.), bit this evidently applies only to srities: the European inission reports that deposits aid
other short-ten transactions remain subject to authorization
in DernMrk as of 1988.
5434. Bahrain Ss a snaller differential than the others, aid
even than sas of the &iran ocizrtries with controls, like
Spain aid Irelard.[It should be rcted that the forward rate
quotel by rclay 's applies to the Saudi riyal; we mattE it up
with the hraini interest rate b.use m local interest rate
is available for Saudi Arabia aid the t nuties are said to
be closely tied finarcially. The riyal is classified by the
fliT wder the sans exchange rate arrangasnt as Bahrain 's
curre_rcy, the dinar, which wcxild suggest that the sans forward
rate could be applied to bath.Rit the riya]. exchange rate
does in fact vary sanewbat, so that air neasured covered
interest differential is nit entirely legitimate.]
35. Taylor(1988) isore of the ncst recent of many stifles of
coveredinterest parity within the Iatt Enerket. Such
studies do rct get atthe degree of finarcialmarket
integrationacross natural banlaries.ten authors find
deviations fran covered Interest parity in auth data, it is
often due to low quality of the data, e.g., inexact timlzg.
With high-quality data, Taylor f lids that rered Interest
parity held extraly well in 1985, that it held less well in
the l970s, partiailarly during "thrbilent" periods, that the
differential bad ncstly vanished by 1979, aid that the
differentials that do exist are slightly larger at the lager-
term than shorter—term maturities.a.it, like other sb.th.es,
Taylor has m data on maturities larger than as year.
36. It is still quite likely, however, that there is a wedge
in each country sspantirg the lag—term interest rate fran the
after-tax cost of capital facing fins. Such a 'wave could be
due either to the corporate inns tax systan or to Inperfect
substitutability between bards aid capital. Hatsopctilos,
Krugman aid Siniers (1988) argue that the cost of capital
facing U.S. corporation is higher than that facing Japanese
corporations, even then real interest rates are equal, because
U.S. cczupanies rely ncre heavily on equity financing, which is
uxnre expensive than debt finarcing.See also papers in
Feldstein (1987).
37. Many others have faint a highly significant predictable
riponent of (fd-wp dspr), often when regressing against fd,
aid partici].arly In-sauple. It is possible that such fittings are rct due totinesvaryirg pranitn, as the ratiatia].
expectations apprcadi would have it, bit rather to a time-
varying nxiel of spot rate determination (together with
insufficiently lag sanple periods, aid learning by investors.
S speculatias go outside the socpe of this paper.(See
Frankel aid foot, 1988, ait foot and Frankel, 1989.)
38.Oneview is that the high degree of integration of
financial markets is ore of the of the high degree of
volatility of extharge rates. Althn4i this view goes against
55the mdst 's stardard arguments abait ty specnXLatiat stnzJ.d be stabilizi2 rather than dsstabilizin, a case can be inS.





A. 1929 to 1987 Regressions
1. Savings and Investment
Gross saving is from line ¶ of table 5.1 of the The National Income and
Product Accounts of the United States. 1S29-1 982 (Njf) while gross
private domestic investment is line 16 of the same table. For the years
1983 to 1987 (preliminary), savings and investment are found in table 8-28
of the 1988 edition of the Economic Report of the President Both series
are divided by GNP, line 1 of table 1.1 in the NIPA and table B-i of the
Economic Report of the President All three series are in nominal terms.
2. Instrument 1: The Dependency Ratio
The dependency ratio is defined here as the sum of those older than 64 and
younger than 21 divided by those in the range 21 to 64 years old. Between
1929 and 1969. these data are taken from Series P29, A37, and A41 of
Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Tinies to 1970 (herafter
HSUS). For 1970 to 1987. the data are from various issues of the
Statistical Abstract of the United States, in a table titled "Total Population,
by Age and Sex."
3. Instrument 2: Defense Spending
Defense spending is provided in Series V4FB, Y459, and Y460 of the HSUS
for 1929-1970. Before 1954 defense spending is defined as the sum of
spending by the Departments of the Army, Navy, and (after 1949) Air
Force. After 1954 these departments are lumped as the Department of
Defense. For 1971 to the estimated 1987 expenditures, the data come from
the Statistical Abstract. In the regressions, defense spending is used as a
percent of GNP, collected as above,
4. Cyclical Adjustments
Savings and investment (as a percent of GNP) are cyclically adjusted by
regressing each against the percent gap between actual GNP and trend GNP.
The residuals from these regressions are the cyclically adjusted variables.
Trend GNP is estimated for the period 1955 to 1980 by the Holloway in The
Survey of Current Business, March, 1986, in "The Cyclically Adjusted
Federal Budget and Federal Debt: Revised and Updated Estimates." 1981
through 1987 data are from various issues of Iht$urvev of Current
Business, in the "Reconciliation and Other Tables section.
B. 1869 to 1987 Regressions
1. All Variables, 1 929 to 1 987
All the series for these more recent years is collected as described above in
section A. The series are then averaged over ten year periods, beginning
with 1929-1936. Since no data are available for 1988, the final observation
is an average over nine years, 1979-1g87.
572. Savings andInvestrnen'
Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch provide estimates of gross private saving
and productive capita! formation in table 4 of their paper t)omestlc Saving
as an Active Constraint on Capital formation In the American Economy,
1839-1928: A Provisional Theory? These data are given in terms of
percent of augmented GNP? Column 1. gross private domestic capital
formation, corresponds with the gross private domestic investment used for
later years. Column 5, gross private saving, is not directly comparable with
gross saving in the current National Income and Product Accountsbecause
consumer durables and public land sales are included. Thus, these two
items, In columns 2 and 3, are subtracted from gross private saving to yield
comparable gross saving as a percent of GNP.
3. Gross National Product
Augmented GNP was not directly available in any of the tables I had from
Ransom and Sutch. However, many of the savings and investment
aggregates are given in dollar levels in table E-1 of Working Paper Number
2 of the same series. GNP is calculated here as gross private saving
(column 8 of table E-1) divided by gross private savings as a percent of
GNP (column 5 of table 4) and multiplying by 100. Since percentages are
given with 2 decimal points (xx.xx), errors introduced by this method should
be negligible.
4. Instrument 1: Dependency Ratio
Between 1900 and 1928 the data are collected as detailed above in A.2.
Before 1900, the data are from Series A119-125 and A133 of the
There are two problems with these series. First, only the years 1870. 1880,
1890, and 1900 are available. For this work intervening years were
interpolated assuming a constant growth rate for population in each age
group. Age groups are 0-5, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, and over 65. 1869
numbers were constructed assuming the same growth rates implied by the
1870 and 1880 data. The second problem is that the group 20-24 does not
allow separation of those under and over 21, the dividing line between
dependency and working age in the dependency ratio. Here it is assumed
that 20 percent of the 20-24 age group is age 20.
5. Instrument 2: Defense Spending
Defense spending is calculated as above in A.3. To produce defense
spending as a percent of GNP, the ten year average dollar value is divided
by the implied GNP from Ransom and Sutch.
C. Comparison to 1985 Data
1. Definition of National Savings and Investment
In the earlier study I erroneously included consumption of durable goods
and public land sales in national savings and investment. This is tine in
theory, but the 1929-87 data do not include either of these items. Thus,
1The University of California Project on The History of
aving Working Paper Series, Number 1, Institute of Business and
Economic Research, University of California, Berkeley.
58savings and investment as a percent of GNP were much higher during the
early decades, as compared to the post depression levels. Using corrected
data, it is still true that post-war levels of savings and investment are
lower than pre-depression.
2. The Dependency Ratio
The current definition of the demographic instrument for private saving is
the dependency ratio (see A.2). In 1985 the ratio used was those over 65
divided by those over 20. Since demographers are familiar with the new
measure, and since it is more clearly consumers in the numerator and
savers in the denominator (with life-cycle consumption theory), the new
measure should be superior. In practice, the dependency ratio varies a
good deal over the long sample, while the earlier measure is little more
than a trend line.
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